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CASH RULES EVERYTHING AROUND THE
MONEY BAIL SYSTEM: THE EFFECT OF CASHONLY BAIL ON INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN
AMERICA'S MONEY BAIL SYSTEM
NICHOLAS P. JOHNSON*

INTRODUCTION
For Father's day 2017, songwriter and recording artist
Shawn Carter, better known as "Jay-Z," decided to "take on the
exploitative bail industry," writing an essay that discussed the
injustices surrounding bail and America's criminal justice system.1
After helping produce a docuseries titled "Time: The Kalief Brower
Story," Carter became enthralled in the matter. He discussed the
issues surrounding America's criminal justice system and the bail
industry, including bail's enormously high costs, the expense of
private attorneys' fees, the bail system's adverse impact on the
indigent and their families, and, perhaps most importantly, the
complete reversal of notion of being innocent until proven guilty-

*Assistant Clinical Professor and Director of the Community Economic Development Clinic at Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I am grateful for the supportive
feedback from my law school faculty colleagues: Associate Dean Susan BisomRapp, Professor Steve Berenson, and Professor Ellen Waldman. I am also thankful
to Professor Luz Herrera, Dean Linda Morton, and attorney Jay Sacks. I special
thank you to the research assistance from Thomas Jefferson School of Law student
Luiza Vannucci Dias. A heartfelt thank you to my amazing husband for his never
failing support
1 Shawn Carter, Jay-Z: For Father's Day, I'm Taking on the Exploitative Bail
Industry,TIME (June 16, 2017), http://time.com/4821547/jay-z-racism-bail-bonds/;
see also Travis M. Andrews, For Father'sDay, Jay-Z Pens Oped about a
Predatory Bail System That SeparatesFamilies, WASH. POST (June 19, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/06/19/for-fathersday-jay-z-pens-op-ed-about-a-predatory-bail-system-that-separates-families/.
2 Carter, supra note 1.
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or as Carter calls it, being "Guilty Until Proven Innocent.", 3 Kalief
Brower's story exemplifies the injustice Carter has now worked so
hard to remedy. Browder, at sixteen-year-old, was accused of stealing a backpack and arrested on the spot. 4 Browder's family's
inability to post bail lead to Browder spending the next three years
incarcerated at Rikers Island without a trial, two of which were
spent in solitary confinement. 5 Browder attempted suicide several
times while awaiting a trial that would never come.6 Finally, after
being released once the charges against him were dropped, Browder
took his own life.7
Throughout the United States, there are approximately 1.6
million people imprisoned in state or federal detention centers, and
of these inmates, roughly 450,000 of them are detained in local jails
awaiting trial. 8 This is due in large part to America's money bail
system, which disproportionately impacts poor Americans while
serving as a mere inconvenience for those with a disposable
income. 9 Research shows that of the pretrial detainees unable to post
bail, 60% fall within the poorest one-third of Americans and 80%
fall within the bottom one-half of the poverty scale. 10 One study
conducted on New York City residents found that even when bail
was set at or below $500, many of the City's residents accused of
crimes still could not afford bail." This is particularly troublesome
considering that the vast majority of individuals unable to post cash
3 Id. ("Millions

of people are separated from their families for months at a timenot because they are convicted of committing a crime, but because they are
accused of committing a crime."); see also JAY-Z, GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT (Roc-A-Fella Records 2000).
' Jennifer Gonnerman, KaliefBrowder, 1993 2015, NEW YORKER (June 7, 2015),
5https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015.

id.

6id.
7Id.
8 See Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Detaining the Poor (Prison Policy

Initiative 2016).
9See Melissa Neil, Bail Fail: Why the U.S. Should End the Practice of Using
Money for Bail, 13 JUSTICE POLICY INST. (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/

uploads/justicepolicy/documents/bailfail.pdf.
10 See Rabuy, supranote 8, at 1n.9.
1 See id.
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bail are not dangerous, as they are often arrested for low-level,
nonviolent offenses. 12 Moreover, recent statistics have shown that
while overall crime rates in America are decreasing, our jail
populations are actually increasing. 13
Pretrial detention has detrimental effects on those unable to
post bail, including job loss, family breakdown, the inability to
prepare an adequate criminal defense, and a greater likelihood of
being convicted. 14 Further, pretrial incarceration affects more people
than just the poor, as it places enormous financial burdens on taxpayers.1 5 In 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder indicated that
16
pretrial detention costs taxpayers roughly nine billion dollars.
Also, while the United States Constitution prohibits the government
from imposing excessive bail, 17 twentieth century bail reform has
given judges significant pretrial discretion in setting bail.18 This
discretion has led to judges requiring defendants to post high, but
not necessarily "excessive" bail amounts. 19 A recent adaptation of
this judicial discretion is cash-only bail, in which judges require
defendants to post their entire bail amount in cash to the court in
order to obtain pretrial release.2 °
12

See Laura Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: PretrialDetention, Punish-

ment, & The Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 1297, 1311 (2012).
13 See Timothy R. Schnacke et al., The History of Bail and PretrialRelease,
PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST. 1, 21 (2010); see also Aimee Picchi, The High Price of
Incarceration in America, CBSNEws.coM May 8, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.
com/news/the-high-price-of-americas-incarceration-80-billion/ (indicating that the
overall rates for violent and property crimes have decreased by 45% the last
twenty years).
14 See id.
15

See Samuel R. Wiseman, PretrialDetentionandthe Right to Be Monitored, 123
1344, 1356 (2014).
See Eric H. Holder Jr., Att'y Gen., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, National Symposium

YALEL.J.
16

on Pretrial Justice (June 1, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attomeygeneral-eric-holder-speaks-national-symposium-pretrial-justice;see
also Picchi,
supra note 13 (noting that America's overall corrections budget is $80 billion
dollars).
SU.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required.").
18 See infra Sections I.C.3-4.
19 See infra Section I.C.
20

See infra Section II.C.
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Despite most state constitutions mandating that all persons
21
charged with noncapital crimes be "bailable by sufficient sureties,
also known as the Consensus Right to Bail,22 courts are currently
divided on whether cash-only bail 23 is constitutional. 24 A recent
Fifth Circuit decision took the issue head on, ruling cash-only bail
unconstitutional. 25 The Fifth Circuit held that individuals have "a
state-created liberty interest" in being bailable by sufficient sureties,
and thus, may not be deprived of due process or equal protection
21
22
23

See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 4-5.
See infra Section II.B.
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals in Williams v. City of Montgomery, 739

So. 2d 515, 517 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), defined "cash bail" as "where cash in an
amount equal to, or part of, the total sum of bail is paid into court." Cash-only bail
within the context of this Note refers to the practice of judges setting a specified
amount of bail and requiring the full amount be paid in full for the accused to
obtain pretrial release. See State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 346 n.1(Minn. 2000)
(en banc).
24 CompareBrooks, 604 N.W.2d at 354 (ruling cash-only bail as unconstitutional),
and State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (ruling cash-only bail
as unconstitutional), with State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106, 1111 (N.M.2006)
(ruling cash-only bail as constitutional), and Saunders v. Homecker, 344 P.3d 771,
780-81 (Wyo. 2015) (ruling cash-only bail as constitutional); see also infra
Sections 11.C. 1-2.
25 See O'Donnell v. Harris Cty., 2018 WL 851776, at *5-7 (Feb. 14,
2018)
("[S]tate law forbids the setting of bail as an instrument of oppression. Thus,
magistrates may not impose a secured bail solely for the purpose of detaining the
accused for the purpose of detaining the accused. And, when the accused is indigent, setting a secured bail will, in most cases, have the same effect as a detention
order." Accordingly, such decisions must reflect a careful weighing of the individualized factors.") (internal marks omitted). The bail system in Harris County
used a fixed fee schedule-a set bail amount-that, in practice, did not stray from
the fee schedule. See Debra Cassens Weiss, 5th CircuitSays Cash Bail System in
Texas County Is Unconstitutional,ABA J. (Feb. 15, 2018, 1:38PM), http://www.
abajoumal.com/news/article/5th circuit sayscash bail system in texas county
is unconstitutional (discussing O'Donnell, 2018 WL 851776). The system,
instead, should have considered individual factors, such as the defendant's ability
to pay, dangerous propensities, severity of the crime, etc. Id. Nonetheless, the
procedures in place were held inadequate, as the court in O'Donnellheld that "bail
decision[s] must be made based on individualized factors that weigh the detainee's
interest in pretrial release and the court's interest in securing the detainee's
appearance." See id.
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under the law. 26 Notably however, there is no universal rule to
follow when analyzing a defendant's constitutional challenge to
cash-only bail; instead, courts utilize theories of statutory interpretation to address the meaning and scope of the "sufficient sureties"
language.27 Incidentally, the courts that focus on bail's history or the
intent of the framers are overlooking the bigger picture-cash-only
bail's effect on the indigent.28
It is readily apparent that cash-only bail disproportionately
affects those of a low socioeconomic status. 29 Setting cash-only bail
for low-income defendants who ultimately cannot afford it punishes
3
these
individuals
way of of
pretrial
detention.
0 This detention runs
counter
to a core by
principle
America's
criminal
justice system-

26

See O'Donnell, 2018 WL 851776, at *5-7. While the court's focus in

0 'Donnellwas the cash bail system in Harris County violating due process and
equal protection, those claims are not the subject of this Comment.
27 See Saunders, 344 P.3d at 778 ("[I]n interpreting the plain and unambiguous
language of the Constitution, we follow harmonizing rules similar to those
employed when interpreting statutes."); see also Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 348
("Resolution of the cash only bail issue turns on interpretation of... the phrase
'sufficient sureties."'); O'Donnell,2018 WL 851776, at *6 ("On the one hand, bail
is meant to secure the presence of the defendant in court at his trial... [, and o]n
the other hand, Texas courts have repeatedly emphasized the important of bail as a
means of protecting an accused detainee's constitutional right in remaining free
before trial.") (internal citations omitted).
28 See infra Part III; see also O'Donnell, 2018 WL 851776, at *3, *8 (holding that
the Texas County bail system that failed to consider a defendant's personal
circumstances-including indigence and ability to pay-in the bail and pretrial
release
decisions was unconstitutional).
29
See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 16
(2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/docu
ments/CEA%/o2BCriminal%/2BJustice%/2BReport.pdf ("[B]ecause bail is typically
assigned without consideration for an individual's resources, financial bail policies
often result in detaining the poorest rather than the most dangerous offenders.");
see also Neil, supra note 9, at 13-15 (noting the effect cash bail has on the
indigent).
30 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1304 (indicating that pretrial detention "contradicts the requirements of even our minimal pretrial protection for defendants,
which holds that punishment can only occur after a conviction').
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the presumption of innocence. 31 Thus, judges should refrain from
setting cash-only bail and consider its alternatives, including recognizance bonds32 and electronic monitoring,33 to alleviate the burdens
the money bail system imposes on indigent criminal defendants.34
While cash-only bail is an effective means of ensuring arrestees'
presence at trial and community safety,35 electronic monitoring36
and recognizance bonds37 provide courts with adequate alternatives
in lieu of cash-only bail.38
Part I of this Note provides a general overview of the money
bail system and discusses the history of bail beginning in England
and through the adoption of bail in the United States,39 including the
Federal Bail Reform Acts of 196640 and 198441 and watershed
3 For an in-depth look into the role the presumption of innocence plays in the bail-

setting process, see Joseph L. Lester, PresumedInnocent, FearedDangerous: The
EighthAmendment's Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REv. 1, 1-63 (2005) (discussing
the importance of the presumption of innocence and bail during the pretrial
process of a criminal prosecution). In the context of this Note, the phrase "presumption of innocence" will be used primarily to refer to the government's
inability to incarcerate-or punish-a defendant for failure to make a cash-only
bail. See id. at 7 (referring to the presumption of innocence as "the government
[being] precluded from exacting punishment" and noting that the presumption
"afforded to an accused is a safety precaution to assure that only the guilty are
punished").
32 See Lydia D. Johnson, The Politics of the Bail System: What's the
Pricefor
Freedom?, 17 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY'S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 171, 199
(2015) (describing release on one's own recognizance as an alternative to low-risk,
poor defendants).
33 See Wiseman, supranote 15, 1348-49, 1364-82 (providing electronic monitoring of individuals as a twenty-first century solution to the burdens and inequalities
the money bail system imposed on the indigent).
31 See State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106, 1111 (N.M. 2006) (cautioning trial court
judges to only use cash-only bail as a "last option" after careful consideration of
other alternatives).
35 See Philip J. Van De Veer, No Bond, No Body, and No Return ofService: The
Failureto Honor Misdemeanorand Gross Misdemeanor Warrantsin the State of
Washington, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 847, 876-77 (2003).
36 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1348-49, 1364-82.
37 See Neil, supranote 9, at 31-32.
38 See infra Section III.C.
39
See infra Part 1.
40 Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (repealed 1983).
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United States Supreme Court decisions regarding bail.42 Part II
examines the factors judges use to set bail, the constitutionality of
cash-only bail, the states' split on the issue, and competing scholarly
views on alternatives to money bail.43 Part III analyzes the impact
cash-only bail has on the indigent and how state courts have ignored
the bigger picture-cash-only bail's effect on indigent defendants.44
This Part argues in favor of individualized bail proceedings and
nonfinancial conditions of pretrial release, concluding that the
benefits of these solutions outweigh their costs or limitations.45
I.

ADDICTED TO MONEY: THE EVOLUTION
OF BAIL AND THE CURRENT MONEY BAIL
SYSTEM

In its most basic sense, bail today is known as an amount of
cash or other security that a criminal defendant pays to be released
before trial.46 Once a defendant is arrested for alleged unlawful
conduct, the defendant will appear before a magistrate 47 within
twenty-four hours to be informed of the charges against the defendant and for bail to be set. 48 A judge is given wide discretion in
determining the type of bail to set or whether bail should be

Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2008).
See infra Sections 1.C. 1-4.
13 See infra Part
II.
" See infra Sections III.A-B.
15 See infra Part
III.
46 Bail, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining bail as "[a] security
such as cash, a bond, or property ... required by a court for the release of a
criminal defendant who must appear in court at a future time").
17 A magistrate is typically "a quasi-judicial officer given the power
to set bail,
accept bond, [or] accept guilty pleas." District-CourtMagistrate, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A magistrate is usually a judicial officer with limited
jurisdiction and authority as compared to a judge. Magistrate,BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This Note will use magistrate and judge interchangeably
as ajudicial officer who sets bail.
48 See Paul Bernard Wice, Bail and Its Reform: A National Survey 12 U.S. Dep't.
of Justice (1973); see also Van De Veer, supra note 35, at 849.
41

42
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denied. 49 However, the presumption of innocence, which protects
the accused from punishment and incarceration before conviction,
provides a counter balance to the judge's discretion and mandates
that pretrial release be the rule and pretrial detention be the excep5
tion.50 This presumption
is fundamental in the bail-setting process. 51
Despite pretrial release being the norm, two competing
objectives of bail have led to many criminally accused individuals
sitting in jail rather than out on bail.52 In addition to preserving the
accused's presumption of innocence,53 the second and more notable
objective of bail is that courts set bail to ensure the accused's
appearance at trial.54 These purposes date as far back as the Statute
of Westminster 55 in Anglo-Saxon England, through Colonial
America and are still very much alive in the criminal justice system
today.56

'9See Wice, supra note 48, at 11; see also Barbara Gottlieb, NAT'L INST. OF
JUSTICE, Public Danger as a Factorin PretrialRelease: A ComparativeAnalysis
of State Laws 65 (1984) ("Statutes often list factors that judicial officers should
take into consideration in establishing conditions of release, but the weight to be
given to information concerning potentially relevant factors is within the judicial
officer's discretion.").
50 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1331 (explaining that the Bail Reform Act of
1984 reaffirmed pretrial release as the norm).
51 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1,7-8 (1959) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("[B]ail...
is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found
convenient to give them a trial. On the contrary, the spirit of the procedure is to
enable them to stay out of jail until a trial has found them guilty.").
52 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1403-04 ("[T]housands of criminal defendants
around the country are imprisoned to ensure their presence at trial despite being
eligible for release.").
53See, e.g., State v. Barton, 331 P. 3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014) (en banc); State v.
Hance, 910 A.2d 874, 879 (Vt. 2006).
51 See, e.g., Tmjillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Ark. 2016); Saunders v.
Hornecker, 344 P.3d 771, 781 (Wyo. 2015); State v. Jackson, 384 S.W.3d 208,
216 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106 (N.M.2006).
55 Statute of Westminster, 1275 § 3 Edw. 1c. 15 (Eng.).
56 See June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor'sNew Clothes: Rediscovery of
Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REv. 517, 517
(1983).
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A. Money in the Bank: Common Forms of Bail
If a judge decides the accused's risk of pretrial flight or
danger to the community is low, then that judge may impose certain
forms or conditions of pretrial release to ensure the accused's
presence at trial.57 The most frequent form of bail that judges
impose is cash bail. 58 For cash bail, a judge sets a fixed amount of
money and the accused either pays the court the full amount of the
bond or pays 10% of the bail amount to the court or bail bondsman. 59 If the defendant deposits 10% of the bond amount to the
court directly and does not miss a court appearance, 90% of the
defendant's 10% deposit is returned to the defendant.6 ° In addition
to cash bonds, judges may impose pretrial release conditions as a
form of bail, in which defendants' pretrial release is subject to their
compliance with drug tests, pretrial services, and other communitysupervision requirements. 61 There is also the least restrictive form of
bail known as a recognizance bond, or a release on one's own
recognizance. 62 A recognizance bond allows defendants to be
57 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 9 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The ques-

tion when application for bail is made relates to each one's trustworthiness to
appear for trial and what security will supply reasonable assurance of his appearance.").
58 See Wice, supra note 48, at 10. The court may also release defendants on
property bonds, in which property is offered as collateral in lieu of money. See id.
at 11. Courts rarely use property bonds, however, because such bonds raise ethical
dilemmas if the defendant fails to appear. See id.
59 See id. at 10. Because this Note focuses on a trial court's imposition of cashonly bail and the alternatives to that particular method of bail, the use of commercial bail bondsmen will not be discussed in depth. It is worth noting, however, that
because "[c]ommercial bondsmen rarely lend bail money of $1,000 or less, their
services are usually too expensive for low-income or indigent offenders." See
Appleman, supra note 12, 1306. Thus, commercial bail bondsmen do not represent an adequate alternative for low-income defendants. See id.
60 See Wice, supra note 48, at 10 (discussing the differences between defendants
paying the court 10% of the bond amount versus paying commercial bail bondsmen 10% of the bail amount, in which the defendant will not recover any of his
10% payment).
61 See id.Neil, supranote 9, at 7; see also Wice, supranote 48, at 11.
62 See Wice, supra note 48, at 11-12.
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released pretrial without posting a security or complying with any
63
court-ordered conditions. While a recognizance bond may seem
like the least trustworthy device to ensure defendants' appearance at
trial, bail reform projects suggest that recognizance bonds are an
effective tool in ensuring defendants' attendance at trial 64
.
B. Paper Trail: The Origins of Bail from AngloSaxon England to Colonial America
In the late Anglo-Saxon era, England created the concept of
bail out of concern that people who were sued in private grievances
would flee to avoid paying money to their injured victims. 6 5 During

the Norman Conquest 66 in the eleventh century, however, the state
began to govern private disputes, imposing capital and corporal
punishment instead of monetary fines as a sentence.6 7 This alteration
of punishment during the Norman Conquest gave criminal defendants more incentive to flee out of fear of physical harm, which lead
to judges using bail as a means of incarcerating criminal defendants
to ensure their presence at trial. 68 In response, Parliament passed the
Statute of Westminster,6 9 which differentiated between bailable and
nonbailable offenses. 70 The Statute protected the accused from
63

See Neil, supranote 9, at 7 (noting that recognizance bonds only require defen-

dants to provide a signature agreeing to appear for future court dates). Pretrial
defendants may also be released on an unsecured bond, in which the accused signs
a contract agreeing to appear in court and accepting liability for a set bond amount
if the accused fails to appear. See id.
64 See infra Section I.C.2.
65 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 1-2. In order to ensure that compensation
would be paid, the cost of pretrial release was identical to the amount payable to
the injured party. See Carbone, supra note 56, at 519-20, describing this bail
system as "perhaps the last entirely rational application of bail," as its purpose was
to ensure the victim or victim's family was properly compensated for their loss.
66 Norman Conquest, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at https://www.
britannica.com/event/Norman-Conquest (last visited April 30, 2018).
67 See Carbone, supra note 56, at 520-21.
68 See id.at 522.
69 Statute of Westminster 1275, 3Edw. 1 c. 15 (Eng.).
71 Statute of Westminster 1275, 3 Edw. 1 c. 15 (Eng.); see also Matthew Hegreness, America's Fundamentaland VanishingRight to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. REv. 909,
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judges' abusive bail practices while providing both consistency and
certainty in bail administration.71 Ultimately, other than capital
offenses, which were not bailable, bail was considered a right.7
After many centuries of governance in the bail-setting process, the Statute of Westminster gave way to reform. 7 Parliament
passed the Habeas Corpus 74 Act of 1679, 75 which established
procedural safeguards for the criminally accused and prevented long
delays between arrest and the bail hearing.76 Despite these procedural safeguards, the Act still left open one glaring problem surrounding bail-judges setting "impossibly high bail" amounts such
that defendants could not afford pretrial release.77 These high bail
amounts operated as an effective denial of bail and lead to
defendants being detained indefinitely. 78 However, the passage of
917 (2013) ("For all offenses that were bailable, officers of the crown had no
power to deny bail: persons accused of bailable offenses 'shall from henceforth be
let out by sufficient Surety, whereof the Sheriff will be answerable and that
without giving ought of their Goods." (quoting Statute of Westminster 1275, 3
Edw. 1c. 15 (Eng.))).
71 See Carbone, supra note 56, at 524.
72 See Hegreness, supra note 70, at 918 ("[F]or all of English history, from before
the [Norman] Conquest until the time of American independence, only the most
serious of felonies were not bailable, and bail was available not as a matter of
judicial discretion but as a matter of right.").
73 See Carbone, supra note 56, at 527-29.
7' Habeas Corpus, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

(10th ed. 2014). Habeas corpus

means "that you have the body." Id. Habeas corpus is meant to ensure that a
person's imprisonment or detention is not illegal. Id. While habeas corpus
provides defendants with the right to be heard and to be released from unlawful
detention, the Constitution does not indicate when such detention is unlawful. See
Hegreness, supra note 70, at 912.
75 Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Cha. 2 c. 2 (Eng.).
76 See Carbone, supra note 56, at 528.
See Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 959, 967 (1965) [hereinafter Foote, ConstitutionalCrisisin Bail] (noting that
"by setting impossibly high bail the judges erected another obstacle to thwart the
purpose of the law on pretrial detention").
78 See Hegreness, supranote 70, at 919 ("After the Habeas Corpus Act []... one
great loophole remained: Officials could 'requir[e] bail to a greater amount than
the nature of the case demands.' Such excessive bail was a defacto denial of bail
for bailable offense, violating the spirit, though not the letter, of the law." (quoting
77

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*297)).
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the English Bill of Rights in 1689 quickly closed this judicial loophole, 79 as it provided people with the first prohibition against excessive bail. 80 Eventually, all these protections against abusive bail
practices-including bail as a matter of right in noncapital cases,
habeas corpus, and protection against excessive bail-became
fundamental to bail in colonial America. 81
However, while America's Constitutional framers adopted
many of the essential bail rights from English Parliament, the
framers left out explicit language regarding an absolute right to bail
in noncapital cases. 82 Instead, the framers afforded citizens no
federal right to bail, leaving the right to bail in the hands of Congress and the states. 83 Following the ratification of the United States
Constitution, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789,84 which
79 English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1W. & M. Session 2 c. 2 (Eng.).
80

See Hegreness, supra note 70, at 919. The English Bill of Rights excessive

clause reads: "That excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines
imposed nor cmell and unusuall Punishments inflicted." See id at 919 n.30
(quoting English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 W. & M. Session 2 c. 2 (Eng.)).
81 See id at 919 ("These constitutional statutes were the pillars of bail in colonial
America and shaped the colonists' understanding of bail.").
82 See Foote, Constitutional Crisisin Bail, supra note 77, at 968. These
elements
the framers integrated from English Parliament included: (1) the distinction
between bailable offenses, nonbailable offenses, and those left to the discretion of
the judges who determine a defendant's ability to make bail; (2) effective habeas
corpus procedures for accused detained pretrial; and (3) protection against excessive bail. See id; see also Hegreness, supra note 70, at 946 ("The Federal Constitution, therefore, does not explicitly guarantee the right to bail [.]").
83 Carbone, supranote 56, at 533. After describing the states enactment of a right
to bail, Carbone notes "The Constitution of the United States... guarantees only a
right to have bail determined in accordance with law. Every person subject to
arrest enjoys.., a guarantee that the bail set not be excessive. But the Constitution
does not define which crimes are bailable, nor which defendants can be detained.
That definition-the definition establishing the parameters of the right to bailremains entrusted to Congress and the states."
84 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91. The Act reads "And upon all
arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may
be death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a circuit
court, or by a justice of the supreme court, or ajudge of a district court, who shall
exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and circumstances of the
offence, and of the evidence, and the usages of law."
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worked in concert with the Eighth Amendment 85 to create three
distinctive features surrounding bail: (1) that bail should not be
excessive; (2) that defendants' right to bail in noncapital cases vests
upon the discretion of the court; and (3) that bail is meant to assure
the appearance of the accused at trial.86 While these features would
remain largely untouched until the mid-twentieth century,87 the
consequences of the framers' omission of an explicit, absolute right
to bail in noncapital cases has caused uncertainty and inconsistency
among legislatures, courts, and legal scholars today. 88
C. It's All About the Benjamins: Twentieth Century
Bail, Its Reform, and the Shift Towards Today's
Money Bail System
After the Judiciary Act of 1789, the next major changes to
bail came in the 1950s with the Supreme Court decision Stack v.
Boyle. 89 After the number of pretrial detainees began to rise, Congress worked to ensure that bail and pretrial release were more
accessible to the accused. 90 However, after the Nixon Administration began the "war on crime" in the 1960s and 1970s, the concept
of bail changed again, making bail less accessible. 91 This last major
reform to bail culminated with the passing of the 1984 Bail Reform
Act, which the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional in United
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.").
86 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 5.
87 See infra Section I.C.
88 For a description of the history and debate surrounding the right to bail, see
85

Foote, ConstitutionalCrisisin Bail,supranote 77, at 969-89 (calling the omission
of an explicit right to bail in the Federal Constitutional an "anomaly," but concluding that a right to bail is implied in the Constitution); see also Hegreness,
supra note 70, at 915-16 (arguing for the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
citizens' right to bail); see also infra Section I.C (discussing the inconsistencies
among the Supreme Court, Congress, and the general public with regard to bail);
infra Part II.
89
See Stackv. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
90 See Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (repealed 1983).
91 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1837; see also infra Section I.C.3.
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States v. Salerno.92 Since that time, the decision to grant or deny bail
has largely remained within the discretion of the judiciary, who may
effectively deny bail based on the accused's potential dangerousness
to the community.9 3
1. Give'em the Loot: The Supreme Court
Takes on Bail, Part I
In the 1950s, the Supreme Court decided two watershed
cases that led to Congress's passage of the Federal Bail Reform Act
of 1966. 9' In 1951, the Court decided Stack v. Boyle, 95 which held

that persons arrested for a noncapital offense are unequivocally
entitled to bail as of right. 96 In Stack, the trial court set a uniform
bail at $50,000 for each of the twelve defendants, 97 despite the
defendants providing the judge with evidence of their indigence and
inability to pay the high bail amount. 98 Ordering that the case be
remanded to fix a reasonable bail for each of the defendants, the
Court determined that setting an unusually high bail amount based
on the indictment alone is arbitrary. 99 The Court reasoned that
pretrial release gives the accused an opportunity to prepare a defense
92

See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987) (upholding the 1984 Bail

Reform Act as constitutional against due process claims).
93 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (1984) ("The judicial officer shall order the pretrial release
of the [accused] ... unless the judicial officer determines that such release ... will
endanger the safety of any other person or the community.").
9' See Stack, 342 U.S. at 1; Carlsonv. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 524 (1952).
95 Stack, 342 U.S. at 1.
96 Stack, 342 U.S. at 4 (explaining that "[u]nless the right to bail
before trial is
preserved, the presumption of innocence would lose its meaning").
97 The defendants in Stack were arrested for violating the Smith Act, an anticommunist regime, and were charged with conspiracy to overthrow the government. Id. at 3. The trial court initially set bail for each defendant at a range from
$2,500 to $100,000; however, the government motioned for the trial court to
increase bail to $50,000 for each defendant. Id.
98
d. In granting the government's motion to increase bail, the trial court relied on
information that four people, who were previous charged with the same violation
of the Smith Act and released, had forfeited their bail and fled. Id. However, none
of those four fleeing defendants were the twelve defendants in Stack. Id.at 4.
99
See id.at 6-7.
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and prevents the government from inflicting punishment before a
conviction. 1°° Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, however, may
have laid the groundwork for the Court and Congress to decline bail
rights in the future. 1° 1 Justice Jackson determined that not every
defendant is entitled to bail, but
instead, is only entitled to a reason102

able opportunityto make bail.
Three months later, the Court decided Carlsonv. Landon, 10 3
which limited the Court's holding in Stack. 10 4 In Carlson, the
Department of Immigration and Natural Services detained individuals and charged them with being foreign aliens who were members
of the Communist Party. 10 5 Notably, the Department argued that
pretrial detention was warranted because the arrestees were previous
members of the Communist Party who posed a danger to the United
States.106 After determining that the defendants were properly
denied bail, 10 7 the Supreme Court-following Justice Jackson's
100

See id. at 4-5. The Court further held: "The right to release before trial is condi-

tioned upon the accused's giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and
submit to sentence if found guilty..... [T]he modem practice of requiring a bail
bond or the deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional
assurance of the presence of the accused. Bail set at a figure higher than an amount
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth
Amendment." Id. at 5.
Id.(internal citations omitted).
101 See id. at 10 (Jackson, J., concurring).
102
103
104

See id.
Carlson,342 U.S. at 524.
Compare Stack, 342 U.S. at 6 (Vinson C.J.) (describing a defendant's right to

bail as "unequivocal"), with Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545 (denouncing any absolute
right to bail and holding the excessive bail clause merely provides that bail shall
not be excessive).
105 Carlson, 342 U.S. at 527. The arrestees brought forth
numerous claims,
including violations to their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights, their Eighth
Amendment rights, and a constitutional attack on to the Immigration Act that
allowed
for their pre-deportation detention. Id.
106
Id. at 529.
107 Id. at 541 ("[B]ecause of Congress's understanding of [alien Communists]
attitude towards the use of force and violence in such a constitutional democracy
[,]
...evidence of membership plus personal activity in supporting and extending
the Party's philosophy concerning violence gives adequate ground for detention.").
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concurrence in Stack° 8-ruled that the Eighth Amendment did not
provide "a right to bail in all cases, but merely ... that bail shall not
be excessive." 10 9 Thus, leading into the 1960s, the Supreme Court's
decisions established that bail and pretrial release were important,
but not unlimited. 110
2. Blowin' Money Fast: Moving Away
from Money Bail with the Manhattan
Bail Project and the 1966 Federal Bail
Reform Act
The mid 1960s brought changes to earlier bail procedures,
marking the first significant bail legislation since the Judiciary Act
of 1789.111 Judges-similar to English judges before the passage of
the English Bill of Rights in 1689
_used their discretionary
authority to set high and unattainable bail amounts for defendants to
prevent their release before trial. 113 Justice initiative groups began to
notice the effect that these discretionary decisions had on the
poor. 1 14 Empirical evidence gathered in the wake of the Stack and
Carlson decisions concluded that individuals unable to post bail

108

See Stack, 342 U.S. at 10 (Jackson, J., concurring) (finding that "not... every

defendant is entitled to bail [] ... but he is entitled to an opportunity to make
[bail] in a reasonable amount").

109 Carlson,342 U.S. at 545. The Court went on to hold, "the very language of the

[Eighth] Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable." Id.
110 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 9 ("With these two cases, the Supreme Court
established that while a right to bail is a fundamental precept of the law, it is not
absolute.").
...
See Appleman, supranote 12, 1329-30.
112 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
113 See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 10.
114 See Caleb Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in
Philadelphia,102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1035 (1954) [hereinafter Foote, Compel-

ling Appearance in Court] (describing that once state courts had failed to consider
an accused's financial condition in the bail-setting process, "[t]he elimination of
the financial factor resulted in bail being set in amounts which. . . 'are too low to
deter the rich, but high enough to prohibit the poor"' (quoting Reginald Heber
Smith, Justiceandthe Poor,23

CAMPBELL

L. REv. 74 (1919))).
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were not only poor,115 but also more likely to be convicted than
defendants released pretrial. 116 As a result, the Manhattan Bail Project of 1961 took hold, helping criminally accused secure pretrial
release while providing an alternative to the money bail system.117
The Manhattan Bail Project's purpose was to test whether
more defendants could be released on their own recognizance if
judicial officers were given more information on defendants' character and reputation within the community. 118 The Project operated
under the assumption that defendants with close ties to the community were the least likely to flee. 119 After measuring defendants'
likelihood of fleeing based on communal ties, 120 the Project's
workers recommended to the courts the best candidates to be
121
released on their own recognizance in lieu of a money bond.
Ultimately, the Project succeeded-not only because less than 1% of
the total defendants released on their own recognizance failed to
appear in court 122-but also because the Project's success gained
national attention, paving the way for Congress to codify bail
reform. 123
115 See

Schnacke, supra note 13, at 10; see also Neil, supra note 9, at 6 ("In 1954,

reports began to show that an increasing majority of people detained while
awaiting trial were of low income.").
116 See Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court, supra note 114, at 1058 ("[A]
jailed defendant's inability to search out evidence and persuade witnesses [oin his
behalf to testify ...suggests that the handicap of being in jail may result in a
number of convictions which would not occur were the defendant given his liberty
during the pretrial period.").
7See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 10.
118 See Gottlieb, supranote 49, at 7.
119 See Carbone, supra note 56, at 552-53. Carbone indicates that the Manhattan
Bail Project used a point system to measure defendants' communal ties and also
considered "defendant[s'] prior record, family ties in the area, employment or
school attendance, and length of residence in the community." Id. at 533.
120

See id.

121

See Carbone, supra note 56, at 552-53; see also Schnacke, supra note 13, at 10

[Tlhe Manhattan Bail Project was designed to provide information to the court
about a defendant's ties to the community and thereby hope that the court would
release the defendant without requiring a bail bond.").
122 See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 10.
123See Carbone, supranote 56, at 533.
("
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After the Manhattan Bail Project, Congress passed the Bail
Reform Act of 1966.124 Congress passed the Act in hopes of encouraging judges to use nonmonetary release conditions due to money
bail's adverse effect on the poor. 125 The Act mandated that pretrial
release be based on the most minimal release conditions possible
while still ensuring defendants appeared at trial. 126 Ultimately, the
Bail Reform Act of 1966 was a high mark for Congress and the
criminal justice system, as it made bail and pretrial release more
accessible to poor defendants accused of low-level, nonviolent
crimes. 127 The Act affirmed the presumption in favor of pretrial
release and moved away from judges' practice of setting impractical
monetary bail requirements. 128 Moreover, the Act did not permit
judges to consider defendants' potential danger to the community if
released before trial. 129 However, a change in political power
brought30 a new regime that continues to affect pretrial release
1
today.

124

See Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (repealed 1983); see

also Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 976 (1961) (noting
that where risk of flight is great, "judges frequently [] deny bail in such cases
simply by setting bail so high that the accused cannot meet it," which is contrary
to the statutory and constitutional protections of many jurisdictions).
125 See State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 350 (Minn. 2000) (en banc) (summarizing the events leading to the passage of the 1966 Bail Reform Act).
126 18 U.S.C. §3146(a) ("Any person charged with an offense, other than an
offense punishable by death, shall ... be ordered release pending trial[,] ...unless

the [judicial] officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a
release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required."); see
also GOTTLIEB, supra note 49, at 6 (indicating that the Federal Bail Reform Act of
1966 sought to make the bail decision more fair and rationale, requiring judges to
release defendants on the "least restrictive conditions that would ensure their
appearance at trial").
127 Carbone, supra note 56, at 554-55 ("The Bail Reform Act [of 1966] ... permit
[ted]
greater pretrial release of those unlikely to face harsh sanctions after trial.").
128
See id. at 553.
129 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (omitting any consideration of defendants' future dangerousness in pretrial release decisions).
130 See infra Section I.C.3.
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3. Dead Presidents: The Nixon Effect
and the Bail Reform Act of 1984
After Congress ushered in a new era of bail reform in the
1960s, public concern over America's recent increase in crime, particularly among defendants out on bond pending trial, called for a
more restrictive bail process.131 Because judges could not consider a
noncapital defendant's potential dangerousness to the community,
many saw the 1966 Bail Reform Act as failing to address public
safety.132 Once President Richard Nixon was elected, however, bail
considerations and bail accessibility began to change. 133 President
Nixon's "law and order" campaign mandated pretrial detention for
criminally accused who presented a clear danger to the community.134 President Nixon's campaign ultimately led to a major
change in bail, as it allowed courts to detain noncapital defendants
prior to trial without bail based solely on their potential danger to
the community. 135
In response to the increased crime rates involving pretrial
detainees as perpetrators, 136 Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of
1984 in conjunction with the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984.137 While the 1984 Bail Reform Act restated Congress' earlier
initiatives to keep pretrial release the rule and pretrial detention the
exception, the Act nonetheless allowed judges to deny defendants
131
132

See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 17.
See id. ("Highly publicized violent crimes committed by defendants while

released pretrial prompted calls for more restrictive bail policies and led to growing dissatisfaction with laws that did not permit judges to consider danger to the
community in setting release conditions.").
133 See Hegreness, supra note 70, at 915 ("Th[e] war on bail, along
with the
broader war on crime, began with President Nixon's election in 1968.").
134

See id. at 956-58.

135

See id.
See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 17 ("The 1970s ushered in a new era for the

136

bail reform movement, one characterized by heightened public concern over
crime, including crimes committed by persons released on a bail bond."); see also
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (noting the increased rate in
crime among those out on bond).
137 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50.
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pretrial release based on the defendants' flight risk or potential danger to the community.138 If a judge determines that no condition
would ensure either the accused's presence at trial or the safety of
the community, the Act then allows judges to detain the accused
without bail. 139 Thus, the 1984 Bail Reform Act shifted the focus of
pretrial detention away from the concern of undermining the presumption of innocence and towardsthe use of pretrial detention as a
means of regulating the safety of the community.140
4. Paid in Full: The Supreme Court Takes
on Bail, Part II
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 brought change to America's
bail system. 141 Public safety and the well-being of the community
became the linchpin of an accused's pretrial bail determination, as
bail proceedings focused almost exclusively on the accused's future
danger to the community. 142 As one scholar notes, the last Supreme
143
Court case to deal with the right to bail, United States v. Salerno,
ended the hope of invalidating the 1984 Bail Reform Act. 144 This
occurred when the Supreme Court, with Chief Justice William
138

See generally Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) ("The judicial

officer shall order the pretrial release of the [accused] ... unless the judicial officer determines that such release... will endanger the safety of any other person or
the community."); see also Applemaii supranote 12, at 1331.
139 18 U.S.C. § 31483142(e).
140 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1333-35 (holding that the Bail Reform Act of

1984 and the Supreme Court's decision in Salerno "struck a blow to concepts of
retributive criminal justice [,]" which is predicated on the belief that a person can
only be punished for a crime the person has committed (citing United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987))).
141 See supra Section I.C.3.
142 See id. at 1330 ("The [Bail Reform Act of 1984] was predicated on protection

of the public and community safety, making this factor one of the most critical in
the determination of whether to release or detain defendants before trial.").
143 481 U.S. 739, 739 (1987).
144

See Hegreness, supra note 70, at 959. But see Appleman, supra note 12, at

1349 (arguing that the Salerno decision, while rejecting facial challenges to the
1984 Bail Reform Act, still leaves open the possibility for as-applied challenges to
Act).
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Rehnquist writing for the majority,14 5 upheld the constitutionality of

the 1984 Bail Reform Act. 146
In Salerno, two defendants were arrested and charged with
racketeering and other crimes stemming from their alleged involvement in one of New York's organized crime families. 147 The
government argued that because no reasonable condition of the
defendants' pretrial release could ensure the community's safety, the
defendants' bail should be withheld. 148 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court agreed, holding that the 1984 Bail Reform Act adequately
addressed the growing public concern that pretrial defendants out on
bail pending trial were dangerous and more likely to commit new
crimes while on bail. 149 The Court recognized that pretrial detention
serves the compelling government interest of protecting the safety
and welfare of the community. 150 Further, the Court rejected the
defendants' Eighth Amendment challenges, reaffirming principles
from Carlson v. Landon-that the Eighth Amendment does not

145

See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739. Chief Justice Rehnquist served as Assistant

Attorney General under President Nixon. See Hegreness, supra note 70, at 959.
Hegreness notes, "the great victory in Nixon and [John] Mitchell's effort to
destroy the right to bail came in 1987, when Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had
been Mitchell's right-hand man as Assistant Attorney General[,] ... wrote the
majority opinion in Salerno." Id.
146 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741.
147 Id. at 743. Combined, the two defendants were charged with twenty-nine
counts of racketeering, mail wire fraud, extortion, and gambling. Id. The government sought to prove that Defendant Salerno was the boss of the Genovese crime
family and that Defendant Cafaro was a captain in the same crime family, thereby
presenting a danger to the community. Id.
148 Id. The government offered evidence of wiretaps implicating the defendants in
various conspiracies and produced two witnesses testifying as to the defendants'
involvement in numerous murder conspiracies. Id.
149 Id. at 746-47 (determining that rising rate of crime committed by those on
pretrial release was "a pressing societal problem" wherein the 1984 Bail Reform
Act
could be a "potential solution").
15
1 Id. at 746-52. The Court held that "when Congress has mandated detention on
the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of flight ... the Eighth
Amendment does not require release on bail." Id. at 754-55.

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vols. 36-37

bestow an absolute right
to bail, but rather prohibits excessive bail
151
from being imposed.
After the Salerno decision, courts shifted focus in bail determinations from defendants' communal ties and likelihood of appearing at trial 152 to the defendants' potential danger to the community if
released. 153 As Justice Marshall argued in his dissent in Salerno, this
shift exhibits the deterioration of the presumption of innocence in
pretrial proceedings. 154 The tension that the Supreme Court decisions on bail, the Bail Reform Projects, and the Bail Reform Acts
created has spilled over to and caused conflict among the states. 155
The inconsistency with bail has also led156to differing views amongst
the states with respect to cash-only bail.
II.

MONEY, CASH, WOES: CASH-ONLY BAIL AND
MONEY BAIL AMONGST THE STATES

Judges may consider a number of different factors when
setting bail; however, none are more important in the eyes of state
legislatures than ensuring defendants' appearance in court and

151

See id. at 754-55; see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952)

(holding that the excessive bail clause provides that bail shall not be excessive
rather than an absolute right to bail). The Court in Salerno also expressly rejected
the Stack Court's use of the Excessive Bail Clause to provide a right to bail for all
defendants, indicating:
"The Court in Stack had no occasion to consider whether the Excessive Bail
Clause requires courts to admit all defendants to bail, because the statute before
the Court in that case in fact allowed the defendants to be bailed. Thus, the Court
had to determine only whether bail, admittedly available in that case, was excessive if set at a sum greater than that necessary to ensure the arrestees' presence at
trial." Salerno,481 U.S. at 753.
152 See supra Sections 1.C. 1-2.
153See supra Sections I.C.3-4.
154 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 763 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[A]t the end of the day

the presumption of innocence protects the innocent; the shortcuts we take with
those whom we believe to be guilty injure only those wrongfully accused and, ultimately, ourselves.").
155 See infra Part II.
156 See infra Part II.

2017-2019

Cash Rules Everything

potential danger to the community. 15 7 Although cash bail is the most
frequently used method of bail, 158 courts rarely give weight to a
defendant's financial resources and ability to post bail.15 9 Instead,
judges use their discretion to set extraordinarily high bail amounts
that are nonetheless reasonable based on "bail schedules" and the
seriousness of the crime charged. 160 A recent trend is for judges to
impose a cash-only bail, which requires defendants to post the entire
bond amount in cash to the court, without using any other security,
surety, or discounted amount. 16 1 Rather than individualizing the
process to determine an accused's flight risk, 162 courts often only
review the charged offense and set a specific cash-only bail amount
16 3
based off that charge.
Moreover, because there is no explicit right to bail in the
federal constitution, 164 courts reviewing cash-only bail challenges
treat such challenges as solely a state constitutional issue. 165 When
reviewing cash-only bail challenges, courts interpret their states'
sufficient sureties clauses-also known as the Consensus Right to
Bail Clause 166-which provides that all persons accused of nonSee Lester, supra note 31, at 3.
See Wice, supranote 48, at 10.
159 See id. at 25-26.
160 See Lester, supra note 31 at 26-28.
157

158

161 See

State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 346 n.1 (Mfinn. 2000) (en banc) (referring
to cash-only bail as judges setting a monetary bail amount satisfied only by defendants posting the full amount set by the court).
162 See Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supranote 124, at 975-77
(advocating for the use of individualized bail determinations that consider an accused's
communal ties and financial resources).
163
164

See infra Section II.A.
See Foote, ConstitutionalCrisisin Bail, supra note 77, at 969-89 (noting no

explicit right to bail in the federal constitution); see also Fragoso v. Fell, 111 P.3d
1027, 1030 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) ("The United States Constitution is not implica-

ted; although the Eight Amendment protects against excessive bail, 'there is no
federal constitutional right to bail."' (quoting Rendel v. Mummert, 474 P.2d 824,
826-27 (1970))).

See State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014) ("Because the federal constitution contains no clause requiring that defendants be bailable by sufficient sureties, this is purely a question of state constitutional law.").
165

166

See infra Section I.B.
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capital offenses are entitled to bail by sufficient sureties.167 Courts,
when deciding the constitutionality of cash-only bail, analyze the
text, history, intent of the framers, and purpose of their states'
Consensus Right to Bail Clause to determine whether cash-only bail
serves as a sufficient surety.161
A. Money Affiliated: Factors that State Court
Judges Analyze When Setting Bail
Generally, when judges set bail, they must keep in mind the
169
goals of bail, including (1) the defendant's appearance in court;
(2) the safety of the community; 170 and (3) the defendant's liberty
interest before conviction. 171 Also, to ensure an impartial and holistic bail determination, judges consider various factors and balance
them with the aforementioned goals. 172 Despite a plethora of factors
and circumstances available to judges when setting bail, 173 most
courts consider four factors in particular: (1) the accused's criminal
history; (2) the accused's reputation within, and dangerousness to,
the community; (3) the accused's ties to the community, including
167

See Hegreness, supra note 70, at 923 (indicating the most common language of

the clause reads: "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for
capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great").
168 See infra Sections 11.C. 1-2.
169

See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 14.

170

See Appleman, supranote 12, at 1330.

171

See Lester, supranote 31, at 3.

172

See State v. Gutierrez,) 140 P.3d 1106, 1109 (N.M.2006) (holding that in deter-

mining bail, the court must "balance the defendant's interest in pretrial release
with the State's interest in securing the defendant's appearance at trial and the
interest in safeguarding the community from any potential threat").
173 See Lester, supra note 31, at 55. These other factors in setting bail include:
(1) the accused's history of appearing in court; (2) the accused's ability to make
bail; (3) the accused's funds used to make bail and financial resources; (4) the
probability of committing a crime if released; (5) protecting the public or prevening danger to society; (6) the weight of evidence against the accused; (7) the
accused's flight risk; (8) whether reasonable restrictions could be placed on the
accused in allowing pretrial release; (9) whether the accused accrued new charges
while on pretrial release; and (10) prosecutors' or pretrial services' recommendations. See id.; see also Weiss, supra note 26.
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employment, family, and property; and (4) the nature of the charged
offense. 174 Some states inquire into the defendant's financial resour175
ces, but few actually inquire into a defendant's ability to post bail.
In addition, state courts often use bail schedules to guide
their decisions. 176 Bail schedules are predetermined bail amounts
based on the accused's charges. 177 Bail schedules seek to standardize the bail-setting process, provide guidance to judiciaries, and
increase efficiency. 178 However, these predetermined bail amounts
often vary by county and provide judges with little-to-no guidance
on an accused's dangerousness or likelihood of appearing in
court. 179 Furthermore, the bail schedule amounts often become the
defendant's actual bail amount, 180 leaving no room for individualized bail proceedings or judicial discretion. 181 Even if judges do
174

See id at 24; see also Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124,

at 974 (noting that bail is often set based on the offense because the greater the
punishment the defendant faces, the more incentive he has to flee).
175 See Lester, supranote 31, at 25 (citing Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Nevada, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia as those states that "inquire specifically into the defendant's ability to pay a bond if set"); see also Wice, supra note
48, at 14 ("One of the most ironic aspects of the bail-setting procedure is that the
factor explored least frequently by the judge has the greatest impact on the defendant's ability to secure pretrial release-his financial status and the amount of bail
he can afford to pay.").
176 See Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of JudicialDiscretion?, 26
CRIM. JUST. 12, 13 (2011). Bail schedules are defined as "procedural schemes that
provide judges with standardized money bail amounts based upon the offense
charged, regardless of the characteristics of an individual defendant." Id.
177 See id at 13-14 (noting that many jurisdictions have fixed money bail
schedules that are predetermined based on the defendant's highest charge); see
also Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1360 (describing that bail is "largely determined
by fixed bail schedules, which ... often forces indigent defendants and their
families to spend money that otherwise would have covered basic necessities").
178 See Neil, supra note 9, at 22-23 (describing bail schedules as an arbitrary
attempt to standardize bail proceedings based on the crime charged).
179 See Neil, supra note 9; see also Carlson, supra note 176, at 16-17 ("To the
extent that bail schedules encourage judges to surrender their ability to impose
such discretionary conditions, [bails schedules] mn completely contrary to public
safety interests.").
180 See Lester, supra note 31, at 25-26.
181 See Neil, supra note 9, at 23 ("Another concern for bail schedules is that, if
they are required to be used, judicial discretion in the bail setting is limited."); see
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not use bail schedules, outside pressures such as newspapers, media
outlets, politics, and the community as a whole may cause judges to
stay away from pretrial release, fearing adverse public opinion or
disapproval
if they release defendants who end up committing new
182
crimes.
B. Universal Language: The Consensus Right to
Bail Clause Among the States
Just as United States citizens have certain bail protections
from the federal government,1 8 3 states have protected their citizens
with what has been collectively known as the Consensus Right to
Bail Clause. i1 4 In 1682, Pennsylvania was the first state to draft the
Consensus Right to Bail Clause.18 5 The most common phrasing of
the Clause reads, "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient surealso Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 974 (arguing that
the offense should not be the only determinant in setting bail, as courts should
consider the defendant's community reputation and ties, past criminal record, and
the defendant's likelihood of guilt). The American Bar Association has rejected
the use of bail schedules and has declared that "[b]ail schedules are arbitrary and
inflexible [. Bail schedules] exclude consideration of factors other than the charge
that may be far more relevant to the likelihood that the defendant will appear for
court dates." See Standards for Criminal Justice: Pretrial Release § 10-5.3(e) cmt.
at 113, AM. BAR Ass'N (2007), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/criminaljusticestandards/pretrial release.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Standards].
182 See Wice, supra note 48, at 15, 25 (noting that "pressures exerted on the
judiciary by the press and general public influence the bail-setting decision' and
publicity from the mass media may cause judiciaries to "adopt[] a very cautious
position on pretrial release"); see also Lester, supra note 31, at 44 ("When faced
with the political backlash of letting a 'dangerous' suspect back out on the street,
what judicial officer would not be biased towards detention?").
183 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 5 (indicating three distinct features surrounding
bail in America after the Eighth Amendment and Judiciary Act of 1789, including
bail as a means of assuring the accused's presence at trial, a right to bail in noncapital cases, and a right against excessive bail).
184 See Hegreness, supra note 70, at 923.
185 See id at 920 (describing Pennsylvania's bail scheme as "the true prototype for
the Consensus Right to Bail Clause [that would be] enshrined in the majority of
state constitutions").
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ties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the
presumption great."' 18 6 Forty-two of the fifty states have adopted this
Clause within their state constitutions, 187 while another six states
have protected the right to bail by statute. 188 However, with the
federal decline in bail rights in the 1970s and 1980s,

189

states began

to follow the federal model and consider bail based on defendants'
danger to the community or pretrial flight risk. 190 Nevertheless,
today, forty-eight states have protected this Consensus Right to Bail
either statutorily or constitutionally. 191
C. Money, Power, Respect: Cash-Only Bail and Its
Constitutionality Among the States
With the majority of states providing a right to bail through
their state constitutions or statutes, the question of whether cashonly bail is a "sufficient surety" within the meaning of the Consensus Right to Bail Clause has provided a split among state courts.192
Eight states have ruled that cash-only bail is constitutional, while
seven states have ruled that cash-only bail is unconstitutional. 193 The
remaining thirty-four states have either not yet been presented with
an opportunity to rule on the issue, or have declined to rule on the
issue directly. 194 The substantial-public-interest exception has
allowed courts to hear such challenges notwithstanding the moot116

Id. at 920, 923.

187 See

id.at 921-23. Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,

New York, Virginia, and West Virginia are the eight states that have not provided a
Consensus Right to Bail Clause in their constitutions. See id.at 969-96.
188 See id. at 949 (explaining that the Consensus Right to Bail was given constitutional and statutory protection in forty-eight of the fifty states).
189 See supra Sections I.C.3-4.
190 See Hegreness, supra note 70, at 962 ("[MV]ost [states] followed the Bail
Reform Act [of 1984] and made it lawful to deny bail to persons who courts find

pose a danger to the community or are likely to flee.").
191 See id. at 969-96 (providing tables with each states' constitutions over the
course of history and their modification of the Consensus Right to Bail Clause).
192 See id. at 940 ("Courts have recently split over whether the Right
to Bail

Clause in their state constitutions prohibits cash-only bail.").
193See

infra Sections 11.C. 1-2.

194 See infJa Section

II.C.3.

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vols. 36-37

ness doctrine1 95 and subsequent events in an accused's criminal
prosecution. 196 In determining the constitutionality of cash-only bail,
courts have utilized canons of interpretation to determine whether
cash-only bail constitutes a sufficient surety. 197 Although indigent
defendants have raised Equal Protection claims, arguing that cashonly bail violates equal protection under the law, some courts continue to treat the issue as strictly a matter of interpretation. 198
1. Put Your Money Where Your
Mouth Is: States Ruling CashOnly Bail Constitutional
Eight states-Alabama, 199 Arizona,200 Arkansas,2

°2 Iowa, 201 Missouri, 204 New Mexico,225206
°5 and Wyoming
do,2d02
195

1

Colora-

-have

Mootness Doctrine, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("The princi-

ple that American courts will not decide moot cases-that is, cases in which there
is no longer any actual controversy.").
196 See, e.g., Tmjillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 804 (Ark. 2016) ("Because the

imposition of 'cash only' bail affects all criminal defendants seeking pretrial
release, the public, our judiciary and members of the bar, it falls within the
purview of the exception to the mootness doctrine as an issue of substantial public
interest."); see also State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 348 (Minn. 2000) (en banc)
(noting that failing to decide the constitutionality of cash-only bail "could have a
continuing adverse impact on those defendants who are unable to post a cash only
bail").
197 See, e.g., Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 806 (interpreting the meaning of the sufficient
sureties clause through its ordinary meaning and dictionary definition); State v.
Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 582 (Iowa 2003) (looking to the intent ofthe framers of
Iowa's state constitution to determine the meaning of sufficient sureties); State v.
Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106, 1111 (N.M. 2006) (analyzing what the purpose of bail
is to interpret whether cash-only bail is a sufficient surety).
198 See Neil, supra note 9, at 15-16 ("Current practices allow for people to be
treated differently within the criminal justice system on account of their financial
status [which] is believed to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."); see
also O'Donnell v. HarrisCry, 2018 WL 851776, at *10 (Feb. 14, 2018) ("[T]he
incarceration of those who cannot pay money bail, without meaningful consideration of other possible alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal protection requirements.").
199 See Williams v. City of Montgomery, 739 So. 2d 515 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).
200 See Fragoso v. Fell, 111 P.3d 1027 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
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held that cash-only bail constitutes a sufficient surety. Among other
things, these courts have looked to the history of their constitutions
to uncover the meaning of "sufficient sureties. 2 °7 For example, in
Fragosov. Fell,208 police charged the defendant as a co-conspirator
in a conspiracy to sell marijuana. 20 9 The trial judge set bond at
"$50,000 cash" and denied the defendant's request to put up
$50,000 worth of real estate in lieu of the cash amount.21 ° In
response to the defendant's argument that Arizona law does not
explicitly authorize cash-only bail, the Arizona Court of Appeals
held that cash-only bail constituted a sufficient surety. 211 The court
reasoned that America's expanding frontier and rural areas made
cash the only conceivable means of ensuring the defendant's
appearance at trial.212 Thus, the court determined that, at the time
Arizona adopted its Consensus Right to Bail Clause, Arizona's
constitutional framers intended to permit cash-only bail.213
In addition to history, courts have looked to the textual
meaning of the sufficient sureties language to determine cash-only
bail's constitutionality. For example, in State v. Briggs,214 the district court imposed a $6,500 cash-only bond for the defendant jump201 See Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 801.
202 See Fullertonv. Cty. Court, 124 P.3d 866 (Colo. App. 2005).
203 See State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 2003).
204 See State v. Jackson, 384 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. 2012).
205 See State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106 (N.M.2006)
206 See Saunders v. Hornecker, 344 P.3d 771 (Wyo. 2015).
207 See id.at 778-79 (explaining that Wyoming and other courts

to be confronted

with the issue of whether cash-only bail is constitutional have looked to the
meaning of the "sufficient sureties" and interpreting the clause either broadly or
narrowly).
208 See Fragoso, 111 P.3d at 1027 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
2 9
1 Id. at 1029.
210 Id. The trial judge initially set bail at $250,000, but lowered the amount to
$50,000
cash-only. Id.
211
Id. at 1031-34.
212
Id. at 1032-33.
213 See id. at 1033 ("We have no basis for concluding that the drafters of our constitution intended to foreclose a cash-only restriction as one of the conditions by
which [assuring the defendant's presence at trial] could be attained.").
214

See Briggs,666 N.W.2d at 573 (Iowa 2003).
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ing bail on a prostitution charge. 2 15 In holding cash-only bail constitutional, the Iowa Supreme Court determined that Iowa's constitutional framers used the sufficient sureties language to create access
to a surety in some form; however, the framers did not intend to give
individuals unlimited access to any surety.2 16 The court held that the
framers qualified "surety" with "sufficient" to give judges discretion
within the bail-setting process, and cash-only bail is within the
purview of that discretion.2 17
These courts have also held that the purpose of each state's
Consensus Right to Bail Clause should be interpreted broadly when
analyzing the constitutionality of cash-only bail. 2 18 For example, in
Saunders v. Hornecker2 19-in which two of three defendants were
unable to post their initial cash bonds of $500 and $2,00022-the
Wyoming Supreme Court determined that because the purpose of
bail was to ensure the accused's presence at trial, the sufficient
sureties clause should be interpreted broadly so as to allow for
215
216

d. at

574-75.

See id. at 582 (holding that the framer's use of historical lineage to draft the

sufficient surety language "was a clear creation of a right to access a surety of
some form [, but] ... d[id] not indicate that the framers intended that a person
should be bailable by any surety without limit") (emphasis in original).
217 See id. at 582 ("By including this ["sufficient"] qualification for
a surety, the
framers carved out a measure of discretion for the person overseeing the bailing
process.").
218 See, e.g., Saunders v. Homecker, 344 P.3d 771, 780-81 (Wyo. 2015)
(holding
that the purpose and language of the words "sufficient surety" allows for cash-only
bail as a broad, constitutionally permissible means for ensuring the defendant's
presence at trial).
2 19
JId. at 771.
220 Id. at 773-74. Three defendants-Amos, Dwyer, and Saunders-had their
cases consolidated because each defendant challenged the imposition of their cashonly bonds. Id. The trial judge set Defendant Amos's bond at $2,000 cash-only
based on charges of interfering with a peace officer and carrying a concealed
weapon. Id.at 774. Defendant Dwyer failed to appear in court for an earlier charge
of failing to maintain liability coverage and his bond was set at $500 cash-only. Id.
Notably, Dwyer plead guilty and the trial judge sentenced him to 23 days in jail,
which was equivalent to the time Dwyer already served in jail before his plea. Id.
Saunders, on the other hand, received a $100,000 cash bail after being arrested on
a warrant for aggravated assault. Id.
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judges to impose cash-only bail.221 Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme
Court in Trujillo v. State,222 defined a sufficient surety as "an
adequate guarantee to ensure the accused's presence at trial. 223
Because cash is one of many broad methods to ensure such appearance, the court in Trujillo held that cash-only bail constitutes a
sufficient surety.224 Unlike the defendants in Saunders, however,
Trujillo's charges appeared much more serious, as police charged
Trujillo with assault and battery on his pregnant girlfriend and her
son.225 Therefore, these courts also impose cash-only bond where
the alleged crime is severe. 226
Like Arkansas, New Mexico has also considered the severity
of the crime and the safety of the community in analyzing cash-only
bail claims.22 7 In State v. Gutierrez,22 8 for example, the defendant
was indicted on multiple counts of murder and manslaughter, and
the trial court set bond at $300,000 cash-only. 2 29 The New Mexico
Supreme Court upheld cash-only bail as a constitutionally permissible means of ensuring the safety of the community. 230 While
defendants have an interest in pretrial release, the court held that this
interest should be balanced against the State's ultimate goals of
221

Id. at 780-81.

222

See Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 801 (Ark. 2016).

223

See id. at 806.

224

See id.

("[B]ased

on the plain language of the constitution and our stated

purpose for bail, we hold that the term 'sufficient sureties' refers to a broad range
of methods to accomplish 'sufficient sureties,' including cash.").
225 Id. at 802. Two of the three defendants in Saunders, 344 P.3d at 774, were
charged with relatively minor charges, whereas the defendant in Tmjillo, 483
S.W.3d at 802, hit his thirty-five-week pregnant girlfriend and her son, attempted
to smother the son, bound his girlfriend, and dunked her under bathtub water.
Initially, Trujillo posted a $25,000 cash or surety bond and was released. Trujillo,
483 S.W.3d at 802. However, after violating a no-contact order, the prosecutor
motioned for Tmjillo's bail to be revoked. Id. At a bail hearing, the trial court set
Trujillo's bail at $300,000 cash-only. Id. at 803.
226 See, e.g., Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 802; see also State v. Gutierrez, 140
P.3d
1106 (N.M.2006).
227 See Gutierrez, 140 P.3d at 1111.
228
Id. at 1106.
2 29
_d. at 1107.
23
1d. at 1110-16.
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securing the safety of the community and ensuring the defendant's
future appearance in court. 231 The court reasoned that a recognizance bond or any other less restrictive alternative-such as
electronic monitoring-could not adequately ensure the community's safety or Gutierrez's future presence in court.232 Nonetheless,
the court in Gutierrez cautioned trial judges who impose cash-only
bonds, indicating that courts should impose the least onerous conditions first and then use cash-only bail as a last resort.233
In addition to using interpretative canons and other justifications to uphold cash-only bail as constitutional, these courts have
noted the similarities and differences between sufficient sureties
challenges and excessive bail challenges. 234 For example, the Iowa
Supreme Court in Briggs235 ruled that the right to bail by sufficient
sureties and the right against excessive bail work together to secure
community safety, ensure defendants' appearance at trial, and
protect defendants against abusive bail practices. 236 In State v.
Jackson,2 3 7 however, the Missouri Supreme Court held that because
the only purpose of bail is to secure the defendant's appearance at
231

See id. at 161 ("We believe the better approach is to balance the defendant's

interest in pretrial release with the State's interest in securing the defendant's
appearance at trial and the interest in safeguarding the community from any
potential threats.").
232

See id.

233

See id. at 162

(" [Wie

caution trial judges to follow the directives of the rule in

exercising their discretion to set conditions of release. The types of secured bonds
authorized are enumerated in the order of priority in which they are to be considered, with the least onerous conditions listed first. Cash-only bail is the last
option and should only be imposed after careful consideration.").
234 See, e.g., State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 583-84 (Iowa 2003) ("[I]t is
conceivable that the use of cash-only bail could violate the excessive bail clause
even though its use does not automatically violate the sufficient sureties' clause.");
State v. Jackson, 384 S.W.3d 208, 216 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (noting that the
misuse of cash-only bail as a means to keep defendants in jail is not addressed by
Missouri's sufficient sureties' clause, but rather addressed by Missouri's excessive
bail clause).
235 666 N.W.2d at 573.
236 See id.at 583-84 ("[T]he excessive bail clause works with the sufficient sureties' clause to protect the interests of the prisoner in the interrelationship between
the state, the prisoner, and the surety.").
237 384 S.W.3d at 208.
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trial, any bail set that is more than necessary to secure that appearance is excessive; thus, the excessive bail clause addresses judges'
misuse of cash-only bail, not the sufficient sureties clause.23 8
The court in Jackson further determined that a challenge to
cash-only bail based on the defendant's inability to pay bail is a
concern with the amount of bail set-that being bail's excessiveness-and not the form in which bail was set-that being bail's
sufficiency as a surety. 239 Thus, while courts have conceded that the
excessive bail clause and sufficient sureties' clause may work in
conjunction with each other, 240 a defendant's inability to post bail
does not render bail excessive. 24 1 Nor does cash-only bail automatically violate the sufficient sureties clause if cash-only bail is found
to violate the excessive bail clause. 242 However, the court in Jackson
determined that setting bail higher than necessary to ensure the
defendant's appearance at trial runs contrary to the presumption of
innocence.2 4 3 The presumption of innocence has laid the foundation
for a handful of states to differ from these eight states and find cashonly bail unconstitutional.2 4 4
238

239

See id. at 216.
See id. at 216 (explaining that challenges to cash-only bail based on the

defendant's inability to post bail are "a concern with the amount of bail, not with
theform of bail permitted").
240 See Briggs, 666 N.W.2d at 583-84; see also Hornecker, 344 P.3d 771, 781
(Wyo. 2015) (holding that the sufficient sureties' clause allows for a broad range
of methods to ensure the defendant's presence at trial, including cash-only bail,
and those methods are determined at the discretion of the trial court and subject to
the prohibition against excessive bail).
241 See Jackson, 384 S.W.3d at 217 ("'Bail is not excessive merely because a
defendant is unable to secure it."' (quoting Dabbs v. State, 489 S.W.2d 745, 748
(Mo. App. 1972))); see also Foote, ConstitutionalCrisisin Bail, supra note 77, at
993 ("[A] mere inability to procure bail in a certain amount does not of itself make
such amount excessive.").
242 See Briggs, 666 N.W.2d at 584 ("[I]t is conceivable that the use of cash-only
bail could violate the excessive bail clause even though its use does not automatically violate the sufficient sureties clause.").
243 See Jackson, 384 S.W.3d at 216 ("bail set higher than necessary to secure the
defendant's appearance or to protect the public [] constitutes an impermissible
punishment, contrary to the venerable presumption that a defendant is innocent
until proven guilty").
244 See infra Section II.C.2.
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2. Money is the Problem: States Ruling
Cash-Only Bail Unconstitutional
Contrary to the eight states upholding the constitutionality
of
245 Idaho, 246 Louisiana, 2 47 Minnesota, 248 Ohio, 249
bail,
cash-only
Tennessee,250 Vermont,2 5 1 and Washington2 5 2 have held that cashonly bail is not a sufficient surety and, thus, violates the Consensus
Right to Bail Clause. These courts have held that cash-only bail
operates as an effective denial of bail.2 53 For example, in Lewis Bail
Bond Co. v. Gen. Sessions Court,254 the Tennessee Court of Appeals
criticized the imposition of cash-only bail by analogizing to a judge
imposing a real-estate-only bond.2 5 5 The Lewis court held that
requiring a defendant to put up only real estate-a luxury not all
defendants have-in order to obtain pretrial release would violate
the Consensus Right to Bail Clause.25 6 The court in Lewis reasoned
that defendants with no real estate-like those with no cash-are
effectively denied a sufficient surety when they are required to post
a real-estate-only or cash-only bond.25 7 Similarly, in State ex rel.

245 See supra Section II.C. 1.
246 See Idaho Code § 19-2907(2)

(2009) ("Although bail may be posited in the

form of a cash deposit [] ... a defendant shall not be required to post bail in the
form of a cash deposit."); see also Two Jinn, Inc. v. Dist. Court of the Fourth Judicial Dist., 249 P.3d 840, 847 (Idaho 2011) (noting that Idaho's Constitution and
Bail Act prohibits cash-only bail prior to conviction for noncapital offenses).
247 See State v. Golden, 546 So. 2d 501, 503 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
248

See State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 352-53 (Minn. 2000) (en banc).

249 See State ex rel. Sylvester v. Neal, 14 N.E.3d 1024, 1032 (Ohio 2014).
250

See Lewis Bail Bond Co. v. Gen. Sessions Court, No. C-97-62, 1997 WL

711137, at *1, *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1997).
251 See State v. Hance, 910 A.2d 874, 881 (Vt. 2006).
252 See State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014).
253

See, e.g., Lewis, 1997 WL 711137, at *5; Hance, 910 A.2d at 881 ("[T]he

imposition of cash only bail is, in effect, a denial of bail under circumstances that
are not constitutionally permissible.").
15'

Lewis, 1997 WL 711137, at*1.

255

See id. at *5.

256

See id.
See id.

257
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Sylvester v. Neal,258 the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that
cash-only bail operated as an effective denial of bail, pointing out
the problem that only wealthy defendants would obtain pretrial
release, while the indigent would remain incarcerated.2 59
Further, these states have interpreted the plain language of
"sufficient sureties" differently than those states allowing for cashonly bail. 260° For example, in State v. Barton,261 the Washington
Supreme Court ruled that the Consensus Right to Bail Clause
requires courts to allow the defendant, at minimum, an opportunity
to post a surety bond in addition to any cash requirements.2 6 2 The
court reasoned that because the history surrounding bail indicated
that suretyship evolved out of third-party arrangements, access to a
"surety" in the context of the Consensus Right to Bail Clause
requires access to a third-party surety.2 63 The court qualified its
holding, however, noting that judges are not required to give
defendants an absolute right to make bail; instead, defendants must
only be given an opportunityto post bail using a surety. 264
In addition, court's ruling that cash-only bail is unconstitutional have determined that the history of bail suggests bail's
primary purpose is to protect defendants, not simply secure their

251 14 N.E.3d 1024 (Ohio 2014).
259 Id. at 1033 ("When a court sets

[cash-only] bail ...

and does not allow the

defendant to secure a surety bond as an alternative, it denies the constitutional
right of the defendant to be bailable by sufficient sureties.").
260 Compare State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (finding that
judges must allow defendants an opportunity to post a surety bond in addition to
cash), with Trujillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Ark. 2016) (finding that cash is
one of many broad methods to ensure a defendant's appearance at trial and is,
therefore, a sufficient surety).
261 181 Wash. 2d at 148.
262 See id. at 162.
263 See id. at 162 ("Focusing on the plain language of [the sufficient sureties'
clause] and reviewing the historical understanding of a surety at the time this
language was adopted, we conclude ... that a defendant must be allowed the
option of a surety arrangement in addition to the option of depositing cash or
property.").
264

See id.
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26
appearance at trial.26 5 For example,
in State v. Hance,266 the Vermont Supreme Court engaged in a historical analysis, finding that
bail both furthers defendants' liberty interests and ensures their
presence at future court proceedings.2 6 7 While history recognized
both interests, the court in Hance held that the sufficient sureties'
clause primarily protects defendants' liberty interests and secondarily serves courts' interests in ensuring defendants' appearance at
trial. 268 Further, because cash-only bail has the effect of detaining
the accused before conviction-thereby depriving defendants of
their freedom before conviction-the court in Hance held that cashonly bail not only violates the sufficient sureties clause, but also
undermines the presumption of innocence. 269 The Idaho Supreme
Court similarly reasoned that cash-only bail fails to protect the
accused from punishment before conviction.
While these courts have acknowledged the competing
purposes of bail-preserving the defendant's liberty interest before
trial versus ensuring the defendant's appearance at trial and communal safety271-these courts have also determined that there can be

265

See State v. Hance, 910 A.2d 874, 878 (Vt. 2006) ("[H]istory indicates that

constitutional bail provisions ...serve not only to ensure a defendant's future

appearance, but also to protect the defendant from pretrial detention by providing a
measure of flexibility in satisfying the court that he will appear as required.").
266
267

910 A.2d at 874.
See id. at 879 (noting that bail "'acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommo-

date both the defendant's interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in ensuring the defendant's presence at trial."' (quoting Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., The Eighth
Amendment and the Right to Bail: HistoricalPerspectives, 82 COLuM. L. REv.
328, 329-30 (1982))).

See Hance, 910 A.2d at 879 (describing the history of the sufficient sureties
clause as "primarily" aimed at protecting a defendant's liberty interest and, con-

268

comitantly, serving the court's interest in having the defendant appear at trial")
(emphasis added).
269

See id. at 879.

271

See Two Jinn,Inc. v. Dist. Court of the Fourth Judicial Dist., 249 P.3d 840, 847

(Idaho 2011) ("The purpose of bail is to prevent the punishment of innocent
persons and at the same time compel the presence of the prisoner when required.").
271 See supra Section II.A; Section II.C. 1.
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more than one purpose behind state constitutional provisions.27 2 For
273
example, the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Brooks
acknowledged bail as having multiple purposes.2 7 4 However, like
the Vermont Supreme Court in Hance, the court in Brooks determined that bail serves the broader purpose of limiting the government's power over the accused, as it provides protection for the
accused's liberty interests against courts' interests in securing
defendants' presence in court.275 Ultimately, these seven states have
held that cash-only bail contradicts the sufficient sureties' language,
the history of bail, the presumption of innocence, and the defendant's liberty interest in pretrial release. 276 Despite substantial case
law on both sides of the issue, however, some states have declined
to rule on cash-only bail's constitutionality as a sufficient surety. 277

272

See State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014) ("[T]here can be more than

one purpose motivating a provision of the state constitution."); see also State v.
Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 350 (Minn. 2000) (enbanc).
273 604 N.W.2d at 345.

See id. at 350 (noting that bail ensures the accused's appearance at trial and
protects the accused's liberty interests).
275 See id. ("In essence, the clause limits government power to detain an accused
prior to trial. The clause is intended to protect the accused rather than the courts.");
see also State v. Hance, 910 A.2d 874, 878 (Vt. 2006) ("To construe the 'sufficient sureties' clause as permitting cash-only bail would increase government
power to engage in pretrial confinement, a result which cannot be reconciled with
... [as] we have recognized the threat to individual liberty inherent in pretrial
detention."); State ex rel Jones v. Hendon, 609 N.E.2d 541, 544 (Ohio 1993)
("[T]he only apparent purpose in requiring 'cash only' bond to the exclusion of
other forms of [bail] is to restrict the accused's access to a surety and, thus, to
detain the accused in violation of [the sufficient sureties' clause.]").
276 Hance, 910 A.2d at 878 ("Our interpretation of the 'sufficient' sureties' clause
should be consistent with our longstanding recognition that bail cannot be used for
the purpose of pretrial detention.").
274

277

See infta Section 11.C.3.
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3. The Other Stacks on Deck: Other States
Confronted with the Constitutionality of
Cash-Only Bail
While a minority of states have addressed the constitutionality of cash-only bail in the sufficient surety context, 278 four
states have either expressly declined the invitation to make a ruling
or have ruled in such a way as to leave the constitutionality of cash-

only bail undecided. 279 New York, for example, in People ex rel.
McManus v. Horn,2 80 prohibited cash-only bail by holding that
judges could not fix only one form of bail because the linguistic
construction of New York's Criminal Procedure Law required at
least two forms of bail for defendants. 2 81 The McManus decision did
not explicitly rule on the constitutionality of cash-only bail, and the
decision adds little to cash-only bail's jurisprudence. 282 The
Montana Supreme Court in State v. Rodriguez28 3 also declined to
decide whether cash-only bail is constitutional, rendering the issue

278

See supra Sections I.C. 1-2 (finding that fifteen states have ruled directly as to

whether cash-only bail constitutes a sufficient surety).
279 See People ex rel. McManus v. Horn, 967 N.E.2d 671, 673 (N.Y. 2012); State v.
Rodriguez, 628 P.2d 280, 284(Mont. 1981); State v. Henley, 363 P.3d 319, 328
(Haw. 2015); Sneedv. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
280 967 N.E.2d at 671.
281 See id. at 665-66 ("The court may direct that the bail be posted in any one of
two or more of the forms specified in subdivision one, designated in the alternative, and may designate different amounts varying with the forms.") (emphasis
added) (citing N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 520.10(2)(b) (McKinney 2006)).
282 See Horn, 967 N.E.2d at 673; see also Maureen Wynne, Note, McManus v.
Horn: The Legality of Setting a Single Form of Bail, 29 TOuRO L. REv. 1537,
1553-54 (2013) (suggesting that the McManus decision, by mandating that trial
courts provide accused persons more than one form of bail, "can be just as
restrictive as setting a single form of bail"). As Wynne indicates, under McManus,
a trial court is required to set at least two forms of bail for the defendant. See id.at
1552. However, the trial court may impose a $20,000 cash bail or a $200,000
partially secured appearance bond, which would require the defendant to pay a
10% deposit totaling $20,000. Id. Thus, despite the McManus decision, Wynne
asks, "whether a choice between two unattainable bail forms is really a choice at
all [?]" Id. at 1554.
283 628 P.2d 280 (1981).
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moot.2 84 The court in Rodriguez noted, however, that cash-only bail

may violate the defendant's liberty interest and the presumption of
innocence.2 8 5 Similarly, a Hawaii court noted the unfairness 286
of
imposing cash-only bail, but ultimately declined to hear the issue.
Perhaps the closest decision to rule on cash-only bail without
actually ruling as to its constitutionality is Sneed v. State, in which
the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that cash-only bail was impermissible, but on other grounds not relating to cash-only bail's constitutionality as a sufficient surety.2 87 The Sneed court held that the
trial court abused its discretion by requiring the defendant to post a
$25,000 cash-only bail. 288 The court in Sneed reasoned that because
the defendant (1) was unable to post the entire $25,000 in cash;
(2) was denied a surety option; and (3) was not determined to be a
flight risk, the trial court had condemned the defendant to jail
289
without reason.
Ultimately, the court in Sneed held that the trial
court abused its discretion in setting cash-only bail 290 without
referring to the sufficient sureties language, despite Indiana having
291
such language in its constitution.

284

See id. at 284. While the Court did not precisely explain why the issue was

rendered moot, it indicated that in the future, if a court sets a cash-bail, the court
must make specific findings backing its decision.
285 See id. (declining to rule on whether cash-only bail violates the sufficient
sureties clause of Montana's state constitution, but finding that cash-only bail
"may well deprive a person of his liberty before trial and clash with the presumption of innocence").
286 State v. Henley, 363 P.3d 319, 329 (Haw. 2015) ("[T]his case highlights the
unfairness in conditioning bail on payment in cash only."). The Hawaii Supreme
Court denied hearing the issue of whether cash-only bail was constitutional
because the defendant failed to raise the issue on appeal. See id.
287 Sneedv. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
288 Id. at 1260. Sneed was charged with dealing methamphetamine. Id. at 1256.
After the trial court denied both the defendant's motion to reduce bail and her
request for a surety option, the defendant claimed that the set bail was excessive
and
that the trial court's bail effectively punished her before trial. Id at 1260.
28 9
_d at

290
291

1260.

See id. at 1256-61 (refusing to render cash-only bail unconstitutional).
See id. at 1260; Ind. Const. art. I, § 17 ("Offenses, other than murder or treason,

shall be bailable by sufficient sureties.").
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Overall, eight states have concluded that cash-only bail constitutes a sufficient surety based on bail's history, its purpose, the
intent of the framers, the severity of the offense, and public
safety. 292 On the other hand, seven states have held cash-only bail
violates states' sufficient sureties clauses, focusing on the defendant's liberty interests.293 Notwithstanding these arguments, four
states have declined to take sides on the direct issue,2 94 perhaps
waiting for scholars and various justice initiative groups to propose
more cost-efficient and practical alternatives. 295
D. Dreams Money Can Buy: Scholars and Justice
Initiative Groups on Cash-Only Bail and
Alternatives to the Money Bail System
Many scholars and justice initiative groups have pointed out
flaws with the money bail system, attributing part of the problem to
judges setting high cash bails-or cash-only bail amounts-that
defendants are unable to meet, thereby resulting in incarceration.296
America's leaders have even called for reform, pointing to the nine
billion dollar bill taxpayers have fronted to incarcerate defendants
before trial.297 In light of the problems associated with the money
bail system, bail scholars and justice initiative groups have proposed
alternatives that neutralize the money bail system's effect on
292
293

See supra Section I.C. 1.
See supra Section II.C.2.

See cases cited supra note 279.
See infra Section II.D.
296 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1306 ("Judges often set money bail at an
294

295

amount the defendant cannot afford."); Lester, supra note 31, at 20 ("A high bail
should not be used as a method of pretrial detention."); Neil, supra note 9, at 13
("[M]oney bail puts people without expendable income at risk of suffering the
adverse impacts of detention."); Rabuy, supra note 8, at 1 ("With money bail, a
defendant is required to pay a certain amount of money as pledged... [, and i]f he
is unable to come up with the money[,] ... he can be incarcerated from his arrest
until his case is resolved or dismissed in court.").
297 See Holder, supranote 16, at 2 ("[Nlearly two thirds of all inmates who crowd
our county jails-at an annual cost of roughly nine billion taxpayer dollars-are
defendants awaiting trial.").

2017-2019

Cash Rules Everything

indigent defendants, including electronic monitoring and recognizance bonds.298 While these alternatives seem both practical and
cost efficient, proponents of the money bail system contend that
these alternatives are flawed. 299 Thus, some scholars have argued in
favor of cash-only bail and have suggested that the money bail
system serves bail's essential purpose-ensuring defendants'
appearance at trial one way or another. 300
1. Make It Rain (on the Poor): The Effects
of the Money Bail System and the Consequences of Failing to Post a Cash-Only
Bail
Strictly speaking, those unable to afford a cash-only bail
1 The effects of pretrial
incarceration impacts defendants across all social strata, affecting
their families, their psyche, and their liberty interests. 302 For example, pretrial detention places burdens on defendants' financial and
family situations. 303 Because these defendants are incarcerated and
unable to work, their families are deprived of financial and emotional support. 304 The pressing need to provide support for their
have only one alternative: incarceration. 30

298

See, e.g., Rabuy, supra note 8, at 6-7 (recommending reducing the amount of

arrests, stopping the criminalization of failing to pay fines or costs, and eliminating
the money bail system altogether); Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1364 (advocating
for the use of pretrial electronic monitoring in lieu of the money bail system); see
also infra Sections II.D.2-3.
299

See in~fa Section JJ.D.4.

300

See id

301

See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1311 ("[F]ewer indicted offenders ...who

have been granted bail are often unable to afford it. [...] [H]igh bail requirements
make it very difficult for indicted defendants to obtain pretrial release.").
302 See Standards, supra note 181 , § 10-1.1, at 36 ("Deprivation of
liberty pending
trial is harsh and oppressive, subjects defendants to economic and psychological
hardship, interferes with their ability to defend themselves, and, in many instances,
deprives their families of support.").
303 See id; Neil, supra note 9, at 13-14.
304 See Neil, supra note 9, at 13-14 (noting the impact that pretrial incarceration
has on poor defendants and their families due to the detainee being unable to
work); Appleman, supra note 12, at 1319-20, 1362 (noting the "emotional and
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families-in addition to defendants' limited access to legal aidleads to these defendants either being convicted for lack of preparedness or, worse yet, pleading guilty to avoid further incarceration. °5 Proponents of bail reform point out that the consequences of
money bail punish the accused before conviction and contradict the
presumption of innocence. 306 Of course, pretrial incarceration only
occurs if a defendant is unable to post bond, or if a judge decides the
defendant is too dangerous to be released into the community. 307
Thus, while indigent defendants are those most likely to be unable to
post even relatively low bail amounts, indigent defendants who are
detained pretrial because of their inability to pay bail are treated as
though they are a threat to the community all the same. 308
economic hardships" that defendants' families suffered as a result of pretrial
incarceration); Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1356-57.
305 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1353-56 (noting pretrial detainees being more
likely to be convicted than those released on bail); Wice, supra note 46, at 23
(holding that because of the limited contact with their attorneys, pretrial detainees
"are far more likely to be found guilty and receive more severe sentences than
those released prior to trial"); Appleman, supranote 12, at 1320 ("The mere possibility of pretrial imprisonment often compels defendants to plead guilty[, and] ...
when confronted with an unaffordable bail, a large number of pretrial detainees
simply plead guilty."); Lester, supranote 31, at 50 ("A person in jail is more likely
to accept a plea bargain to end his time in jail, especially if probation is offered,
than is a person who is out on bail.").
306 See Lester, supra note 31, at 12-14 (emphasizing the importance of
bail and the
presumption of innocence in America's criminal justice system).
307 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1353.
308 See id. (noting that low-level offenders are jailed with convicted and potentially
dangerous defendants who await trial); John Eligon, Top State CourtSays Judges
Can 'tDemandCash Only Bail,N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/03/23/nyregion/new-york-court-of-appeals-rules-judges-cant-limit-bailto-cash.html (referencing the negative effects that cash-only bail has on lowincome people) (last visited Feb. 2, 2017); see also Carlson, supranote 176, at 16.
Carlson argues:
[T]hose defendants who can afford the predetermined bail sum
are released without judicial examination, while those who cannot are detained. The dispositive difference between these particular populations is their access to money, not the risks they
pose. Hinging pretrial liberty upon such a distinction raises
issues of public safety as well as questions about the fundamental fairness of a pretrial release system based upon money.
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2. Easy-E: Electronic Monitoring as an
Alternative to Cash-Only Bail

With the advancement in technology, one scholar has argued
that electronic monitoring provides a feasible solution to the rising
problem of indigent defendants being too poor to post a cash bail.3 0 9
While electronic monitoring is often used in post-conviction situations, 310 this scholar argues that electronic monitoring may provide a
substitute that is at least as effective as cash bail without incarcera-

ting primarily indigent defendants. 311 Further, by continuing to
supervise defendants before trial with an electronic monitoring
device, this scholar argues that electronic monitoring ensures community safety at a cost much lower than pretrial detention.312 Pretrial
release through electronic monitoring also allows defendants to
adequately prepare and defend themselves if their cases go to trial
and allows defendants to continue working to support their

families.313
Notwithstanding the benefits, the implementation of electronic monitoring in the pretrial context has seen little growth.3 14 This
is because electronic monitoring is primarily used post-conviction,
Id.
309 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1364-82.
310 See id at 1365467 (noting types of electronic monitoring used before and after
sentencing include tether-based programs, voice verification, GPS tracking, and
home confinement).
311 See id at 1372 ("Technology might not be able to completely eliminated
detention for flight risk, but it should be able to eliminate detention for poverty.").
312 See id at 1373 (noting electronic monitoring programs may range from $5 to
$25 per day, whereas pretrial detention costs states between $50 to $123 per day);
See id; See also Appleman, supra note 12, at 1362 ("Although [supervision]
services do cost money, in the long term [] they end up saving far more taxpayer
dollars, as it is far more expensive to imprison those indicted offenders waiting for
trial than to supervise them electronically at home.").
313 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1364, 1372; Appleman, supra note 12, at 1362
(arguing that electronic monitoring allows pretrial defendants to continue to support their families in spite of ongoing criminal proceedings).
314 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1374 (noting courts' hesitancy to implement
electronic monitoring and admitting that "[e]mpirically, the cost savings of monitoring in lieu of detention require further detailed investigation'').

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vols. 36-37

and the number of pretrial electronic monitoring studies and their
results remain small and inconclusive. 15 Also, defendants' continued incentive to flee may be one reason why courts believe
electronic monitoring is less effective. 16 For example, those given
pretrial release through electronic monitoring still tamper with their
monitoring devices and abscond. 7 One scholar contends, however,
that additional penalties and criminal sanctions for such tampering
adequately deter defendants from fleeing or interfering with their
devices.318
3. Recognize This: Recognizance and
Conditional Bonds' Feasibility
Various justice initiative groups and scholars also argue that
releasing defendants on their own recognizance provides judiciaries
with an effective way of ensuring the defendants' presence at trial
without imposing onerous financial requirements to post bail.31 9 In
deciding an individual's risk of flight and potential danger to the
community, these groups advocate for judges to use risk assessments
and consider defendants' personal characteristics that may
315

See id. at 1368, 1371 (noting that electronic monitoring may be at least as

effective as money bail, but whether electronic monitoring is more effective than
money bail is inconclusive).
316 See id. at 1371-80 (noting other problems with electronic monitoring,
including defendants tampering with devices, the costs, privacy concerns, and the
incentive to flee without losing money.
317 See id. at 1371.
318 See id at 1371-72 ("These concerns ... can also be addressed by imposing
higher penalties for failing to appear while monitored or for tampering with a

monitoring device.").

See Neil, supra note 9, at 31 ("[T]here is a large proportion of people accused
of offenses that can be released on their own recognizance and trusted to comply
with pretrial requirements of attending court and avoiding re-arrest."); Johnson,
supra note 32, at 199 (indicating that recognizance bonds may provide an alternative to low-risk, poor defendants).
320 See Rabuy, supra note 8, at 29 (defining risk assessments
as "tools that, when
used properly, can provide a dependable prediction of whether a person will be
involved in pretrial misconduct, whether by failure to appear in court or being a
danger to the community"); Neil, supra note 9,at 43 (indicating that the use of risk
319
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make them more or less of a flight risk.321 These factors-including
defendants' family and communal ties, employment status, records
of defendants' past court appearances, and financial resources-may
provide accurate assessments as to defendants' flight risk.3 22 These
factors may also work as a natural deterrent that ensures defendants
do not flee.323 Moreover, scholars argue that judges' ability to
impose court-ordered conditions, such as drug testing, becoming
gainfully employed, pursing educational opportunities, or curfews,
ensures defendants' continued incentive to be law-abiding and
appear for future court dates.324 Court notification systems have also
been suggested to remind defendants of court dates and locations to
help defendants appear in court.325
On the other hand, many of the same advocates of recognizance bonds, risk assessments, and conditional release at the pretrial
stage acknowledge the drawbacks of these alternatives. 326 For example, a study conducted between 1990 and 2004 showed that almost
half of the felony defendants who failed to appear in court were
assessments "provide for informed bail decisions and support judicial officers in
having a reliable, bias-free opinion driving his or her determination").
321 See Neil, supra note 9, at 30. Neil argues that because people rating higher on
risk assessments are generally not released on their recognizance, unsecured
recognizance bonds will be reserved for low-risk offenders. See id.at 31.
322
See id. at 30-31.
323 See Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124,
at 973 (noting the
need for financial conditions in setting bail is unwarranted, as natural deterrents
like employment and personal relationships provide defendants with sufficient
incentive not to flee).
324 See Johnson, supra note 32, at 199; Wiseman, supra
note 15, at 1363
(explaining that court-ordered conditions and pretrial supervised release programs,
when coupled with recognizance bonds, are highly effective and have become the
preferred option for many bail reform advocates). However, proponents of courtordered conditions argue that the conditions must match the defendant's needs,
otherwise, these defendants will end up back in custody. See Neil, supranote 9, at
32 ("Placing inappropriate or unnecessary conditions on people with low risk
ratings... results in higher failure rates.").
325 See Neil, supranote 9, at 32-33 (proposing court notification
systems to offset
the most common reasons for missing court, including forgetfulness, work, or
being in the wrong court room).
326 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1363 (" [R]elease on personal recognizance
...
is, unsurprisingly, less effective in securing presence at trial.").
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those released on their own recognizance. 327 In fact, at least one
scholar has pointed out that indigent defendants' lack of financial
resources may be one of the reasons why indigent defendants are
more of a flight risk in failing to appear in court. 328 Moreover, one
justice initiative group has identified some flaws with using risk
assessments, noting that using factors like family and community
background are unrelated to pretrial conduct and may not provide
accurate risk assessments for all defendants.3 29 Court-ordered
conditions also have their own cost implications, as these conditions
require courts to expend more judicial resources, including pretrial
supervision, which increases the burden on taxpayers. 330
4. Don't Shake the Money Maker!: The
Benefits of Cash-Only Bail and the
Money Bail System
While the arguments providing solutions to the money bail
system and its effect on the indigent seem sensible, there are arguments in favor of cash-only bail and the money bail system as a
whole. 33 1 For example, scholars are concerned that setting up
individualized bail proceedings that weigh all the defendant's
relevant characteristics would be time-consuming, costly, and more

See id. at 1363 n.84 (finding that out of 54,485 felony defendants who failed to
appear in court, 20,883 were released on their own recognizance).
328 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1385 ("[D]efenders of the bail system [may] be
327

able to argue that the same lack of resources that prevents the poor from obtaining
release makes them less likely to fear the repercussions of failing to appear for
trial.").
329 See Rabuy, supra note 8, at 4 n.17. Also, because risk assessments
vary by
jurisdiction, there is a chance that using these tools could actually increase existing
disparities in the criminal justice system between the affluent and the indigent. See
id.
330 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1363 (noting that pretrial
supervision programs, while highly beneficial, can be highly expensive).
331 See Van De Veer, supra note 35, at 848, 874-77; see also Wiseman,
supra note
15, at 1398 (noting the profits that commercial bail bondsmen obtained under the
current regime, dubbing it "a multi-billion dollar industry").

2017-2019

Cash Rules Everything

difficult. 3 2 Also, one scholar has argued that cash-only bail is an
efficient method of ensuring defendants' appearance in court and
keeping the dockets clear.3 33 This efficiency occurs because cash
bail incentivizes defendants to appear in court so that they may
retain their bail money. 334
3 35
Further, cash-only bail may actually lower judicial costs.
If accused are able to secure pretrial release without posting a cashonly bail and are subsequently arrested for new offenses, then the
additional charges will increase taxpayer costs. 336 These additional
criminal charges would also clutter the court dockets. 3 7 Instead,
scholars argue that individuals released on cash-only bonds are more
likely to refrain from crime and appear in court out of fear of losing
their bail money. 338
Ultimately, setting bail can be a difficult decision for a
judge, as the different factors and circumstances making up a
judge's decision may counteract one another.3 39 Although a defendant's danger to the community and risk of flight may be relatively
low, bail schedules and pressures to be "tough on crime" lead to
332

See Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 975 ("Admit-

tedly, the setting of individualized [bail] conditions poses a more difficult problem
than the automatic imposition of bail."); see also Rabuy, supra note 8, at 4 n.17
(noting the challenges that come with using risk assessments, including the lack of
uniformity among jurisdictions that use risk assessments and their questionable
accuracy).
...
See Van De Veer, supra note 35, at 848, 876-77. Van De Veer goes on explain
that the "cash-only bail requirement is also needed to counteract the reduced effectiveness of surety bonds caused by growing failure to honor misdemeanor warrants." Id.at 876-77.
331 See id. at 876-77 (arguing that even if the defendant's family posts the
defendant's bond, these family members still "tend to make sure the defendant
appears in court"); see also Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1365, 1371 (pointing out

that, for obvious reasons, pretrial detention is the only 100% effective method to
ensure the defendant's appearance at trial).
335 See VanDe Veer, supra note 35, at 863.

See id.
337 See id.
338 See id. at 876-77. See also Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1371 (noting
that
336

electronic monitoring, recognizance bonds, and other unsecured bonds fail to provide released pretrial defendants with the necessary incentive to return to court).
339 See supra Section H.A.
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judges ignoring defendants' ability to pay a particularly high bail
amount.3 40 The split of authority among the states addressing cashonly bail's constitutionality can be reduced to the different interpretations of "sufficient sureties" based on the history, text, and
purpose of the Consensus Right to Bail Clause.341 Scholars' and
justice initiative groups' solutions scratch the surface on how to
counteract the money bail system's effect on the poor, but electronic
monitoring, unsecured bonds, and recognizance releases have their
strengths and weaknesses.3 42 Nevertheless, understanding cash-only
bail as a systemic problem and recognizing the state courts' oversight of the current system's discrimination against the poor-a
group highly represented in the criminal justice system 343 _is
imperative towards creating a feasible solution to cash-only bail.344
III.

NO MONEY, MORE PROBLEMS: CASHONLY BAIL'S EFFECT ON THE INDIGENT
AND ALTERNATIVES TO THE MONEY
BAIL SYSTEM

State courts use a variety of interpretative tools to answer
whether cash-only bail is constitutional, including the purpose of
bail, the framers' intent, and the textual meaning of the Consensus
Right to Bail Clause. 45 The use of these tools, however, fails to
address the looming problem of cash-only bail-its effect on indigent criminal defendants, society, and the criminal justice system. 46
Cash-only bail can lead to negative consequences, including false
340

See Lester, supra note 31, at 25-26; Wice, supra note 48, at 15, 25.

See supra Sections 11.C. 1-2.
See supra Sections II.D.2-3.
313See Holder, supra note 16, at 2 ("[A] disproportionate number of [pretrial
341

342

detainees] are poor. They are forced to remain in custody-for an average of two
weeks ... because they cannot afford to post the bail required-vely often, just a
few hundred dollars.").
311 See infra Part III.

315 See supra Section II.C.

See Neil, supra note 9, at 3 ("The vaguely understood pretrial process of bail
costs the taxpayers of the United States billions of dollars and infringes on the
liberty and rights of millions of Americans each year.").
346
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convictions, 34 7 lost wages and family breakdowns, 348 and the
increased cost on taxpayers. 4 9 Ultimately, other than guaranteeing
an indigent defendant's presence at trial-through incarcerationcash-only bail fails to further the goals of bails. 50 Such money bail
fails to accurately assess a defendant's dangerousness and supplants
the presumption of innocence by detaining defendants before conviction based solely on their financial status.351
Moreover, while cash-only bail may be a "sufficient surety"
for some, it is not "sufficient" for low-income people who do not
have the financial resources to post bail.3 52 Although the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 has allowed courts to consider defendants' danger to the community, or lack thereof, when setting bail, 353 courts

should leave behind the abusive practice of using defendants'
financial status as a proxy for pretrial incarceration. 5 4 Further,
because most courts do not assess defendants' income or ability
make bail, 3 5 5 cash-only bail should only be used sparingly-like in
See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1305 (noting that impoverished defendants
plead guilty, even if innocent, to avoid further pretrial detention).
348 See Neil, supra note 9, at 13-14; see also Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1361
117

[M]oney bail and the high pretrial detention rates associated with this antiquated
system impose high burdens on defendants, families, and society.").
319 See Leon Neyfakh, IsBail Unconstitutional?: Our Broken System Keeps the
Poorin JailandLets the Rich Walk Free, SLATE (June 30, 2015, 7:49 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/crime/2015/06/is-bail-unconstitutional
our broken system keeps thepoor injail and lets.html ("Detention should
be based on objective evidentiaiy factors, like whether the person is a danger to
the community or a flight risk-not how much money's in their pocket.").
350 See supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text (outlining the overarching
goals of bail).
351 See Lester, supra note 31, at 12-14.
352 See Lewis Bail Bond Co. v. Gen. Sessions Court, No. C-97-62, 1997 WL
("

711137, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1997) (noting the effect of cash-only bail
on those with a lack of financial resources).
313See sources cited supra note 138 and accompanying text.
311 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1311 (noting that imposing high money bail
"make [s] it very difficult for poor defendants to obtain pretrial release, despite the
fact that the vast majority of these offenders have been arrested for low-level,
nonviolent offenses").
311 See Lester, supra note 31, at 25 ("[A] court cannot set a reasonable bail for a
particular defendant if it makes no inquiry as to how much bail a particular defen-
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Trujio 356 and Gutierrez357 for example, both of which were serious
cases involving violent crimes-and only upon careful consideration.358
In fact, cash-only bail should be used as the Manhattan Bail
Reform Project and the Bail Reform Acts of 1966 and 1984 originally intended secured bonds to be used: only if a defendant's release
on recognizance would not likely ensure his presence at trial and
only for those defendants most susceptible to flight, violence, or
recidivism. 359 Also, the addition of electronic monitoring gives
judges a novel alternative to cash bonds that were not available
during the earlier periods of bail reform. 360 Alternatives like these do
not deplete defendants' or taxpayers' pockets. 361 Further, the
remaining states whose courts have not yet decided cash-only bail's
constitutionality should carefully consider the effects of their
decisions-particularly on the indigent-while also considering
alternatives to cash-only bail.362

dant can afford."); see also Wice, supra note 48, at 14 (finding that a defendant's
ability to pay bail is often the least explored aspect of a bail proceeding).
356

357
358

483 S.W.3d 801 (Ark. 2016).

140 P.3d 1106 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
See id. at 162 ("Cash-only bail is the last option and should only be imposed

after careful consideration.").
359 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 10 (describing the reasoning behind the Manhattan Bail Reform Project as showing judges many defendants can be released on
their own recognizance); Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152
(repealed 1983) (favoring release on recognizance unless accused is a flight risk);
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (favoring release on recognizance
unless accused is a flight risk or danger to community).
360 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1344 (advocating for the use
of electronic
monitoring in the pretrial context and arguing that electronic monitoring may be as
effective as the money bail and surety system).
361 See id. at 1357, 1361, 1363-64 (describing the burdens
that the money bail
system places on indigent defendants and the cost to American taxpayers).
362

See infJa Section III.C.
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A. Money Ain't the Only Thing: Leaving Abusive
Bail Practices Behind and Recognizing a Right
to Make Bail
The abusive practice of judges setting extraordinarily high
bail amounts to keep defendants behind bars-whether to ensure
their presence in court, to protect the community, or because of
political pressures-dates as far back as the Norman Conquest and
has continued even today.363 Reform efforts throughout English and
American history have attempted to combat this abuse of power, 364
but cash-only bail seemingly represents the most recent method of
judges imprisoning criminal defendants prior to trial.365 Throughout
history, bail has changed to provide a general right to bail in
noncapital cases, 366 provide habeas protection against long delays
between arrest and trial,367 and protect against excessive bail.368
However, with the recent controversy over cash-only bail,369 the
divide on cash-only bail's constitutionality has become increasingly

363

See Carbone, supra note 56, at 533 (noting the frequency by which judges

throughout the history of bail set high bails that accused were unable to obtain);
Hegreness, supra note 70, at 919 (pointing out judges' abusive practice of setting
high bail amounts to detain defendants indefinitely before the passage of the
English Bill of Rights); see also Wice, supra note 48, at 15, 25 (noting that outside
pressures from the general public may influence judge's decision in setting bail).
364 See generally Statute of Westminster 1275, 3 Edw. 1 c. 15 (Eng.);
English Bill
of Rights of 1689, 1 W. & M. Session 2 c. 2 (Eng.); Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (repealed 1983).
365 See State ex rel Jones v. Hendon, 609 N.E.2d 541, 544 (Ohio
1993) (ruling that
cash-only bail's only purpose is to restrict access to a surety and detain the
accused).
366 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 5; see also Hegreness, supra
note 70, at 92730.
367 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall
not be suspended.").
368 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required.").
369 See State v. Jackson, 384 S.W.3d 208, 212 (Mo. 2012) ("Although the
sufficient sureties provision has been in effect in many states for almost 200 years,
cases addressing its meaning do not appear to have arisen until the last few
decades.").
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more important to combat judges setting cash-only
bail amounts that
70
overwhelmingly incarcerate poor defendants.
The current protections and features of bail fail to provide an
adequate remedy for poor defendants challenging their cash-only
bail amounts.3 71 For example, the protection against excessive bail
hinges on bail's reasonableness to both ensure the defendant's
appearance at trial 372 and guarantee the safety of others. 373 States'
excessive bail clauses, however, do not consider a defendant's financial status or ability to make bail. 74 Therefore, courts should allow
pretrial defendants to make challenges to cash-only bail under their
states' excessive bail clauses and thereby abandon the practice of
ignoring an individual's inability to afford bail. 75 Further, when
such challenges arise, courts should consider a defendant's actual
ability to post the bail the defendant received. 76 By allowing excessive bail claims to move forward when defendants challenge cashonly bail, and if courts analyze each individual's ability to pay the
bail that is set, indigent defendants will be377protected from unattainable cash-only bonds even as low as $500.

371

See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1305-06, 1310-11 (indicating the effect high

bail requirements has on the indigent). See also supraSection II.C; Section II.D. 1.
371 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1353 ("Money bail is increasingly not an
alternative to pretrial detention but rather an enabler of the practice.").
372 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) ("Bail set at a figure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated to [assure the accused's presence] is 'excessive'
under the Eighth Amendment."); Jackson, 384 S.W.3d at 216 (describing bail that
is more than necessary to secure the defendant's appearance is excessive).
373 See State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 584 (Iowa 2003).
374 See Foote, Constitutional Crisis in Bail, supra note 77, at 993 ("[A] mere
inability to procure bail in a certain amount does not of itself make such amount
excessive."); see also Lester, supra note 31, at 27 ("Just because bail is set at an
amount that a defendant cannot afford does not mean it is per se excessive.").
375 See Wice, supranote 48, at 14 (noting that a defendant's ability to post a cash
bail is often least explored by judges when setting bail).
376

See id.

See Rabuy, supra note 8, at 1 n.9 (indicating that when bail was set at less than
$500, a majority of New York City residents still could not afford bail); Bail: An
Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 975-77 (advocating for the use
of individualized bail determinations).
377
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While courts and scholars alike have determined that a
defendant's inability to post bail does not itself render bail excessive,378 other courts have recognized that cash-only bail may violate
states' excessive bail clauses.3 79 Therefore, reviewing courts should
not be deterred from using excessiveness to strike down a defendant's unattainable cash-only bail.3 80 Like the Indiana Court of
Appeals recognized in Sneed, defendants who are unable to post
cash-only bail, and who are neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, should not be condemned to jail without reason.3 81 The
trial court's arbitrary decision in Sneed constituted an abuse of discretion.382 Thus, whereas the right to bail is limited,383 so too should
a judge's discretion in setting bail be limited. 84
Further, with cash bail becoming even more prevalent, and
because cash-only bail is a state constitutional issue,385 a thorough
review of the money bail system at the state level is necessary to
achieve reform. 8 6 The Supreme Court's decisions in Stack, Carlson,
and Salerno caused immense debate about whether a right to bail

378
179

380

See supranote 241 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 240-242 and accompanying text
See Briggs, 666 N.W.2d at 584 (noting that the use of cash-only bail could

violate the excessive bail clause without violating the sufficient sureties clause).
381
382

See Sneedv. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
See id. at 1256-61 (holding that the trial court abused its discretion rather than

rendering cash-only bail unconstitutional).
383 See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 9 (indicating bail as a fundamental, but limited

right).
384

See, e.g., Lewis Bail Bond Co. v. Gen. Sessions Court, No. C-97-62, 1997 WL

711137, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1997) (finding that a judge's discretion in

determining bail and conditions of release is limited to the factors set out in state
statutes); see also State ex rel. Sylvester v. Neal, 14 N.E.3d 1024, 1032-33 (Ohio

2014) (holding that, notwithstanding the trial court's discretion in setting bail,
requiring cash-only bail restricts the accused's access to a surety in violation of
Ohio's sufficient sureties' clause).
385 See State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (describing
cashonly bail as a state constitutional question).
386

See Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supranote 124, at 973 (addressing

the need for a thorough review of bail and arguing for the judges to abandon the
assumption that financial conditions are necessary in setting bail).
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actually exists. 387 These decisions require that criminal defendants
be given a reasonable opportunity to make bail. 388 However, it is
ultimately up to state courts to interpret their sufficient sureties'
clause in a way that provides defendants accused of noncapital
offenses with this opportunity to make bail. 89 In doing so, courts
reviewing challenges to cash-only bail should look beyond its
history and purposes.3 90 Recognizing that cash-only bail fails to
provide indigent defendants with an opportunity to make bail-and
therefore does not constitute a sufficient surety for poor defendants
seeking pretrial release-is necessary for implementing solutions.391

387

Compare Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (describing a defendant's right

to bail as unequivocal), Foote, ConstitutionalCrisis in Bail,supranote 77, at 96989 (arguing that a right to bail is implied in the Constitution), Hegreness, supra
note 70, at 915-16 (inviting the Supreme Court to revisit Salerno and "recognize
the centrality of bail to the constitutional history of the states and to protect it
under the Fourteenth Amendment), and Lester, supra note 31, at 1-2, 14-15
(indicating defendants have a right to bail to ensure their presumption of innocence), with Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952) (rejecting any absolute
right to bail from the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause and holding
"the very language of the [Eighth] Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable"), and United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754-55 (1987) ("The Court in
Stack had no occasion to consider whether the Excessive Bail Clause requires
courts to admit all defendants to bail.").
388 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 10 (Jackson, J., concurring); see generallysources cited
supra note 387 (acknowledging or conceding to defendants' right to a reasonable
opportunity to make bail). Such an opportunity to post bail or alternative to cashonly bail could also be in the form of a surety arraignment between the defendant
and a third-party. See Barton, 181 Wash. 2d at 156-58, 162; Sylvester, 14 N.E.3d
at 1033.
389 See, e.g., State v. Briggs 666 N.W.2d 573, 582 (Iowa 2003) (ruling that sufficient surety language created a right to access a surety in some form, but not any
form without limit).
390 See supra Sections I.C.1-2 (indicating that courts look to the history,
purpose,
and intent of the framers when analyzing cash-only bail under the sufficient
sureties clause).
391 See State ex rel. Sylvester v. Neal, 14 N.E.3d 1024, 1032-33 (Ohio
2014)
(noting that cash-only bail only allows the wealthy to obtain pretrial release, while
the poor continued to be detained).
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Further, allowing defendants access to more than one form of surety
may close the gap in pretrial detention based on wealth disparity.392
B. Money on States' Mind: The Need for States to
Address the Bigger Picture
Currently, state courts and trial judges use bail schedules and
money bail to standardize and expedite the bail-setting process. 393
Bail schedules and money bail also seek to increase courtroom
efficiency by keeping dockets clear and preventing defendants from
missing court. 94 The result of such practices, however, has led to
many poor defendants awaiting trial from a jail cell instead of being
with their families, working, or preparing their criminal cases. 395
The cost to the taxpayers alone should be enough incentive for the
government and voters alike to work towards a better solution. 396
Since bail is meant to protect the presumption of innocence, state
courts deciding cash-only bail's constitutionality should consider its
effect on the indigent and move for a more individualized bail
process.3 97 Without an individualized inquiry into defendants' abil-

392

See Rabuy, supra note 8, at 1 n.9 (noting that 60% of pretrial detainees fall

within the poorest one-third of Americans and 80% fall within the bottom one-half
of the poverty scale); see also People ex rel. McManus v. Horn, 18 N.Y.3d 660,
675 (2012) (prohibiting case-only bail and holding judges may not fix only one
form of bail).
393 See Neil, supra note 9, at 22-23 (describing bail schedules as an attempt to
standardize bail proceedings); see also Carlson, supra note 176, at 13-14, 16-17
(pointing out bail schedules' flaws and the risks they pose to poor defendants).
391 See Van De Veer, supra note 35, at 876-77 (noting the increased efficiency of
courts when cash-only bail is imposed).
395 See Neil, supra note 9, at 3, 13-14.
396 See Holder, supra note 16, at 2 (estimating the cost of pretrial detain to taxpayers at nine billion dollars per year).
397 See Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supranote 124, at 974 ("To establish a system of pretrial release which will accommodate the presumption of innocence and the desire to secure the attendance of the accused at trial, a thoroughgoing revision of other practices and assumptions is necessary.").
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ity to make bail, bail schedules and cash-only bail will continue to
lead to indigent defendants' detention rather than release.398
To solve the problems the money bail system has created,
judges should first steer clear of bail schedules.399 Instead, courts
should weigh all the appropriate factors and interests when setting
bail 400 and determine bail on an individualized basis. 40 1 Proponents
of the current money bail system believe that the use of bail schedules and cash-only bail increases efficiency within the courts,
which are often flooded due to defendants jumping bail.40 2 These
proponents, therefore, believe cash-only bail saves time, money, and
judicial resources. 403 However, the current spending and costs to
incarcerate pretrial detainees cost more than the profits gained
through the use of bail schedules and cash-only bail.40 4 An individualized inquiry, on the other hand, more accurately assesses defendants' dangerousness to the community and likelihood of appearing
in court, which protects defendants from pretrial incarceration and
saves defendants and taxpayers more money. 405
Next, courts must recognize that ensuring a defendant's
presence at trial or retaining judicial discretion in setting bail are not
398

See Lester, supra note 31, at 26 ("The result [of bail schedules] is a 'going rate'

for bail at the initial appearance and an inadequate examination of the defendant's
ability to pay. As a consequence, defendants may be unnecessarily and unconstitutionally incarcerated. This is especially true of indigent defendants.").
399 See Standards,supra note 181 § 10-5.3(e) cmt. at 113. The American Bar Association has expressly rejected the use of bail schedules, indicating, "[t]he practice
of using bail schedules leads inevitably to the detention of some persons who
would be good risks but are simply too poor to post the amount of bail required by
the bail schedule." Id.
400 See supra notes 169-175 and accompanying text.
401 See Standards, supra note 181, § 10-5.3(e) cmt. at 113 (emphasizing "the
importance of setting financial conditions through a process that takes account of
circumstances of the individual defendant").
402 See VanDe Veer, supranote 35, at 863.
403 See id. at 848, 863, 876-77 (noting the increase costs to the criminal justice
system due to bail jumping and proposing cash-only bail as a solution).
404 Carlson, supra note 176, at 16-17 (noting the costs associated with judges
using bail schedules); see also Holder, supra note 16, at 2.
405 See Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 973-77 (arguing
for an individualized bail-setting process).

2017-2019

Cash Rules Everything

the only purposes of bail, as defendants' liberty interests must also
be considered.4 °6 A judge's discretion to set bail has stood since
colonial America,4 °7 and, by interpreting the Consensus Right to
Bail Clause broadly, courts have held that cash-only bail is one of
many discretionary methods constituting a sufficient surety. 4° 8 However, no amount of judicial discretion should trump an accused's
right to the presumption innocent before conviction. 409 In order to
address cash-only bail's constitutionality, states have resorted to
technical, interpretative tools instead of looking at its discriminatory
effect. 4 10 Recognizing cash-only bail's disparate impact on indigent
defendants and focusing on defendants' financial ability to make
bail is crucial for courts to adequately analyze cash-only challenges.4 11
It is important for courts to consider the nature and seriousness of the offense when setting bail, even with cash-only bail, as
trial courts absolutely must consider the seriousness of the charged
offense when determining the amount and form of bail.4 12 However,
cash-only bail should be reserved for the truly dangerous defendants, rather than those nonviolent, indigent defendants unable to

406

See State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 350, 352-54 (Minn. 2000) (en banc)

(indicating that the primary purpose of bail is to protect the accused's liberty
interest and that cash-only bail fails to further that interest).
407 See Foote, supra note 77, at 968 (indicating that among the elements the
framers took from English Parliament with respect to bail was the distinction
between bailable offenses, nonbailable offenses, and those offenses left to the
discretion of the judges who determine a defendant's ability to make bail).
See Trujillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Ark. 2016); State v. Briggs, 666
N.W.2d 573, 582 (Iowa 2003).
409 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (noting the importance of maintaining
408

access to bail to uphold the presumption of innocence).
410
411

See supra Section II.C; Section II.D. 1.
See State ex rel Jones v. Hendon, 609 N.E.2d 541, 544 (Ohio 1993); see also

Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 809 (Brill, C.J., dissenting) (noting the effect of cash-only
bail on those of low-income).

See Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 974; see also
Lester, supra note 31, at 23; Lester, supra note 31, at 23.
412
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pay low cash-only bail amounts. 413 Trial courts should also exhaust
other alternatives to cash-only bail first, and use cash-only bail only
as a last resort.414 This allows judges to retain their discretion in
determining bail while ensuring
that they only use cash-only bail
415
when the situation calls for it.
Although cash-only bail incentivizes individuals able to post
bail, appear in court, and recuperate their bail money, cash-only bail
fails to reach those indigent defendants who lack the financial
resources to post bail in the first place. 416 Because bail seeks to
ensure defendants' appearance at trial, proponents of cash-only bail
argue that cash-only bail not only makes defendants' appearances
more likely, but also creates a financial incentive for defendants to
appear by retaining their bail money.417 However, this argument
unravels when the bulk of the system's subjects do not have the
money to trigger the incentive.41 8 If defendants cannot scrape
together enough money to post bond, then the incentive to appear in
court disappears, and courts are left with overcrowded jails and
detention centers. 4 19 Thus, eliminating this incentive-driven program
requires courts to shift their focus away from money and mass incar-

413

See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106, 1111 (N.M.2006) (murder and

manslaughter charges); Trujillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 801 (Ark. 2016) (assault

and battery charges).
See Gutierrez, 140 P.3d at 1111 (cautioning trial judges in exercising their
discretion when setting bail and impose cash-only bail as a last resort).
415 See id.; see also State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 582 (Iowa 2003) (noting the
importance ofjudges using their discretion when setting bail).
416 See Neil, supranote 9, at 13-15 (describing cash bail's effect on the indigent).
417 See Van De Veer, supra note 35, at 876-77 (noting cash bail keeps defendants
414

from fleeing and incentivizes them to appear in court); Fragoso v. Fell, 111 P.3d
1027, 1032-33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (finding cash-only bail constitutional as a

means of ensuring defendants' presence in court); Briggs, 666 N.W.2d at 581-85
(indicating cash-only bail achieves the purpose of securing the accused's presence

at trial).
See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1310-12 (noting that a large portion of jail
populations consist of pretrial defendants unable to post bail and that states are
"[i]ncarcerating poor defendants for nonfelony offenses").
419 See id. at 1301; Wice, supra note 48, at 22 (noting the extent of jail and prison
overcrowding).
418
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ceration and towards preserving innocence, preventing punishment
before conviction, and freedom.42 °
Despite cash-only bail's deficiencies, proponents of cashonly bail and the current system stand firm. 421 These proponents
argue that imposing cash-only bail is a reasonable means of not only
ensuring the defendant's appearance in court, but also securing the
424
423
4 22 Cases like Truji[[o
safety of the community.

and Gutierrez,

may lead courts to determine that cash-only bail is constitutional
simply because the interest in community safety and securing defendants' presence at trial outweighs defendants' liberty interests in
pretrial release. 425 However, these cases should be the exception, not
the rule.4 26 The defendant in Trujillo battered his pregnant girlfriend
and her son.42 7 The defendant in Gutierrez was indicted on multiple
counts of murder and manslaughter.42 8 While these courts had legitimate concerns of the defendants' potential dangerousness to the
community. 429 most pretrial detainees are nonviolent. 43 0 For exam420

See Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 969-70 (empha-

sizing the importance of the presumption of innocence in America's criminal
justice system); State v. Rodriguez, 628 P.2d 280, 284 (Mont. 1981) (acknowledging that cash-only bail "may well deprive a person of his liberty before trial
and clash with the presumption of innocence"); Two Jinn, Inc. v. Dist. Court of the
Fourth Judicial Dist., 249 P.3d 840, 847 (Idaho 2011) (describing bail as having
two purposes: "to prevent the punishment of innocent persons and at the same
time compel the presence of the prisoner when required").
421 See, e.g., Van De Veer, supra note 35, at 848, 876-77 (proposing that
increasing the use of cash-only bail may help ameliorate the harms caused by outstanding warrants and defendants' failure to honor those warrants). But see, e.g.,
Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 970-71 (pointing out
the flaws with the money bail system and its ineffectiveness in deterring flight and
accommodating the presumption of innocence).
422 See Lester, supra note 29, at 3.
423 Trujillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801 (Ark. 2016).
424 State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106 (2006).
425 See id. at 161.
426 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1331 (indicating that the 1984 Bail Reform
Act, at least in form, reaffirmed that pretrial release was to continue to be the
norm).
427
428
429

Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 802.
Gutierrez,140 P.3d at 1107.
See id. at 1107; Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 802.
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ple, cases like Fragosov. Fe[[,43 1 State v. Briggs,432 and Saunders v.
Hornecker433 dealt with nonviolent defendants unable to post cashonly bail. 434 These courts all held that cash-only bail was constitutional notwithstanding the defendants' low-level offenses.43 5 While
protecting the community against violent offenders may provide an
adequate justification for cash-only bail, protecting the community
from indigent, nonviolent offenders fails to justify cash-only bail
entirely.43 6
The shortcomings of money and cash-only bail outweigh
many of their benefits, as the failings of the current system and its
effects on the indigent remain.4 37 Bail schedules have proven to be
unworkable, 438 and focusing on the nature of the offense and the
need to secure dangerous defendants' appearance at trial has lumped
in indigent, nonviolent offenders in a financial-incentive system in
which they do not belong. 439 Courts faced with cash-only bail challenges in the future should address the bigger issue of its unfairness

431

See Appleman, supranote 12, at 1311.
Fragoso v. Fell, 111 P.3d 1027 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).

432

State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 2003).

430

33Saunders v. Homecker, 344 P.3d 771 (Wyo. 2015).

See Fragoso, 111 P.3d at 1029 (charging defendant as a co-conspirator to sell
marijuana); Briggs,666 N.W.2d at 574-75 (charging defendant with prostitution);
Saunders, 344 P.3d at 774 (charging two of three defendants with nonviolent
offenses-interference with a police officer and failure to maintain liability coverage-while the third defendant was charged with aggravated assault).
131

135
436

See cases cited supra at 435.
See Lester, supra note 31, at 25 ("Unless the defendant threatened to potential

witnesses, it is improper for the court to look at anything beyond the defendant's
finances in setting bail.").
137 See Tmjillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Ark. 2016) (Brill, C.J., dissenting)
("[C]ash-only bail has drawbacks [as i]t may have an unfair, even disparate
impact, upon lower-income defendants without resources [and] ...may be used
punitively.").
438 See supra notes 179-181 and accompanying text (pointing out the flaws associated withjudges' use of bail schedules on criminal defendants).
139 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1336 (criticizing the 1984 Bail Reform Act's
emphasis on a defendants' future dangerousness in setting bail questioning state's
compliance with the Act despite its deficiencies).
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to many pretrial defendants,4 4 ° and consider the alternatives to
money bail.44 1
C. Proceed with Caution: Alternatives to Cash-Only
Bail
Alternatives are available for judges to use to counteract the
adverse effects of cash-only bail on the indigent.4 42 Electronic
monitoring, for example, allows defendants to live and work in their
communities, thereby promoting defendants' liberty interests while
costing less than pretrial incarceration.44 3 In addition, recognizance
bonds provide a cash-free alternative for those low-risk, low-income
defendants who would otherwise await trial from a jail cell or plead
guilty to avoid further incarceration.4 44 These alternatives consider
the past successes of bail reform in America, but also look to
technology to provide indigent defendants with an alternative to
pretrial detention.4 4 5 States should still, however, proceed with
caution in considering these alternatives, as they still pose problems
and potential abuse.44 6
1. Welcome to the New Age: Electronic
Monitoring as an Alternative to CashOnly Bail and the Money Bail System
States may utilize electronic monitoring to supervise
defendants in the community before trial instead of imposing cashonly bail to incarcerate them.4 47 Electronic monitoring is an effective alternative that furthers the accused's liberty interests before
440

See Carlson, supra note 176, at 16 (noting that the money bail system "raises

... questions about the fundamental fairness of a pretrial release system based

upon money").
441 See supra Sections II.D.2-3; infra Section III.C.
442 See infra Sections III.C. 1-2.
113 See inJfa Section III.C.
1.
...
See infra Section III.C.2.
115 See infra Sections III.C. 1-2
446 See infra Sections III.C. 1-2.
117 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1364-80.
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conviction while also assuring the accused's presence at trial. 448 The
costs of electronic monitoring are low, and, in comparison to
detaining defendants before trial, electronic monitoring would cut
spending almost in half 449 Moreover, these electronic monitoring
devices allow defendants to work and continue to support their
families in between arrest and trial, which is particularly important
to low-income defendants, whose pretrial detention has a greater
effect on their families.450 Offering electronic monitoring to indigent
defendants to secure pretrial release would also help them better
prepare their criminal cases and reduce the likelihood of conviction.

451

The benefits to the defendants that stem from electronic
monitoring are enormous.452 Defendants released on electronic devices are able to see their families and can continue to provide support
for them by working and retaining their jobs.453 Their presence out
in the community is critical for those too poor to post a cash bail, as
defendants' families need them for financial and emotional support.454 Similarly, because electronic monitoring allows defendants
to be out in the community and meet with their attorneys more
freely, electronic monitoring may lead to better outcomes for
448

See id at 1364 ("Increasingly advanced technologies are able to closely moni-

tor pretrial defendants' locations while granting them far greater freedom .... ).
"9 See id. at 1373 (noting pretrial detention costs between $50 to $123 dollars per
day and electronic monitoring costs between $5 to $25 per day).
450 See id. at 1356-57, 1363.
451 See id. at 1356 ("The difficulty of preparing an adequate defense makes the
likelihood of success at trial much lower for pretrial detainees than for those who
have secured release."); see also Neil, supra note 9, at 13-14 (noting the impact
money bail has on poor pretrial defendants in preparing adequate defenses and the
increased likelihood of poor defendants to plead guilty to avoid further detention).
452 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1364.
153 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1362 ("Allowing indicted offenders out
on
bail with the help of electronic monitoring permits them to save their jobs, pay
their bills, keep their homes and see their families.").
151 See id. at 1319-20, 1362 (noting family members of a criminal
defendant
detained pretrial suffer "emotional and economic hardships"); Wiseman, supra
note 15, at 1374; see also Neil, supra note 9, at 13-14 (noting the impact that
pretrial incarceration has on poor defendants and their families due to the detainee
being unable to work).
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indigent defendants' criminal cases and less false convictions.455
The obstacles that pretrial detention creates for defendants in preparing an adequate defense dissipate when defendants are able to
freely meet and discuss their cases with their attorneys out in the
community rather than from jail.456 Further, electronic monitoring
reinforces defendants' expectation of pretrial release by granting
indigent pretrial detainees their freedom before conviction and
preserving the presumption of innocence.457
The most plausible argument against electronic monitoring
is the reduced incentive to appear in court.458 Whereas those
released on a cash bond have incentive to appear in court and recuperate their bail money, 459 defendants released on electronic monitoring devices have no collateral on the line to keep them from
fleeing.46 ° Considering the fact that indigent pretrial defendants lack
financial resources to post bail to begin with, electronic monitoring
provides no additional incentive for indigent defendants to show up
See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1320 (indicating that "[t]he mere possibility of
pretrial imprisonment often compels defendants to plead guilty and give up their
right to trial"); Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1354-56, 1364 (arguing that pretrial
electronic monitoring in lieu of incarceration allows pretrial defendants-who
often plead guilty to avoid further incarceration-more opportunities to consult
with their attorneys).
456 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1364; see also Neil, supra note 9, at 13 (noting
the hardships pretrial defendants face in trying to prepare an adequate defense to
criminal charges while incarcerated, including the inability to "gather witnesses []
and other activities need to present a strong case due to limited phone use, obligations to work long shifts in jail programs, [and] placement in jails long distances
away from their counsel").
157 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1364; see also Lester, supra note
31, at 8-14,
50-53 (noting the role the presumption of innocence plays in the criminal justice
system and how pretrial detention impacts defendants).
458 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1368-72 (highlighting the concern that electronic monitoring will never completely eradicate defendants' urge to flee); see
also Van De Veer, supra note 35, at 848-49, 876-77 (arguing in favor of cashonly bail and the money bail system because of its effectiveness in ensuring defendants appearance in court compared to nonfinancial bail conditions).
159 See Van De Veer, supra note 35, at
876-77.
460 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1371 ("No matter how ingenious the technology, it is likely that highly motivated defendants will find a way to defeat it.").
155
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to court. 4 6 1

Thus, opponents of electronic monitoring see electronic
monitoring not as an alternative, but as a waste of judicial
resources. 462
However, while electronic monitoring may not completely
eradicate a defendant's desire to flee, defendants who abscond from
an electronic monitoring device will be in no worse position than if
they received a secured bond.463 Judges typically either impose a
secured bond or incarcerated defendants for absconding from their
electronic monitoring devices.464 Therefore, pretrial release via electronic monitoring still gives defendants incentive to appear in
court..465 This incentive to appear in court when released via electronic monitoring is at least as effective as cash-only bail in ensuring a
defendant's appearance in court.466
The effectiveness of electronic monitoring in the pretrial
context continues to give courts pause, however, because electronic
monitoring is typically used during post-conviction proceedings, not
during pretrial.467 Many jurisdictions have not adopted electronic
monitoring programs because the statistics on electronic monitoring's effectiveness in the pretrial phase are inconclusive. 468 As a
result, money bail has remained judges' preferred option for pretrial
release. 469 However, electronic monitoring still addresses the over461

See id. at 1385 (pointing out that the lack of financial resources reduces defen-

dants' incentive to appear in court).
462 See Van De Veer, supra note 35, at 864 n.82, 876-77 (noting the waste of
judicial resources when defendants fail to appear in court and the incentive to
appear that cash-only bail provides).
463 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1371-72 (noting that judges may impose sanctions and penalties on defendants released on electronic monitoring who either fail
to appear in court or tamper with their devices).
464
465
466

See id.
See id.

See id.at 1372 (" [Electronic monitoring] has the potential to effectively replace

unmeetable monetary requirements for non-dangerousness defendants.").
467 See id. at 1368-69.
468 See id.
469 See Neil, supranote 9, at 17 ("[A]s many jurisdictions do not have ... pretrial

monitoring programs in place, judicial officers continue to rely on money bail as a
release option."); see also Wice, supranote 48, at 10 (noting judges impose cash
bail most frequently).
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arching problem that the money bail system has created-that is, the
overwhelming pretrial incarceration of poor, nonviolent defendants. 470 Thus, judges in these jurisdictions should experiment with
electronic monitoring in the pretrial context, particularly on nonviolent, low-level offenders, as this alternative to money bail significantly reduces the cost of pretrial release.471 While electronic monitoring has its own costs associated with it, this alternative cuts
communities' costs considerably, as incarcerating defendants pretrial costs more than supervising them out in the community electronically.4 7 2

Ultimately, while further inquiry is needed in determining
electronic monitoring's pretrial effectiveness, electronic monitoring
provides a feasible solution to money bail.4 73 Electronic monitoring
is a substantial improvement over incarceration, as this alternative
furthers defendants' liberty interests and decreases the costs to the
criminal justice system overall.4 74 Thus, courts should consider
using electronic monitoring in those instances where cash-only bail
and money bail would fail to serve the interests of defendants, the
courts, or the community.47 5

470

See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1372 (arguing that electronic monitoring may

eliminate the pretrial detention of the poor).
471
472

See id.

See id. at 1372 (noting that electronic monitoring programs can "generate signi-

ficant savings if used in place of pretrial detention"); see also Appleman, supra
note 12, at 1362 (arguing that electronic monitoring programs save taxpayers more
money than imprisoning indicted offenders).
173 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1378 ("[W]hile future proposed uses of monitoring technology should be carefully scrutinized, this necessarily somewhat vague
threat should not prevent its use to help the very real people currently in jail.").
171

See id. at 1372, 1380 ("[E]lectronic monitoring is a major improvement over

imprisonment, [and] the gap between rich and poor will be narrowed significantly

by using [electronic monitoring] in place of imprisonment for failure to post
bond."); see alsoAppleman, supranote 12, at 1362.
175

See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1374 (arguing that electronic monitoring "can

be at least as cheap and effective as money bail"); see also Appleman, supra note
12, at 1304, 1362 (advocating for the increased use of electronic monitoring in bail
surveillance to combat prison overcrowding and help pretrial detainees obtain
pretrial release).
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2. Recognizance over Money: Release on
Recognizance as an Alternative to CashOnly Bail and the Money Bail System
Releasing low-income defendants accused of nonviolent,
low-level offenses on their own recognizance achieves the overall
goals of bail without infringing on defendants' liberty interests in
the way that money bail infringes on defendants' liberty interests.476
The use of risk assessments and individualized bail proceedingsincluding an inquiry into defendants' financial capacity-will help
judges determine which defendants require a secured bond and
which could be released on their own recognizance.477 Like the
Manhattan Bail Project, in which less than 1%of pretrial defendants
released on their own recognizance failed to appear for trial, 478
courts could revive the same or similar scheme and seek recommen479
dations for those likely to appear under their own recognizance.
The Project's success lead the way for nonfinancial conditions and
pretrial release to become the norm. 480 Therefore, trial courts should
consider recognizance bonds as well as the past success of unsecured releases when setting bail.481
With no security or collateral offered, however, recognizance bonds are arguably the least effective nonfinancial alternative
to money bail, as it fails to incentivize even misdemeanor defendants to appear in court.482 Further, without collateral or incentive,
476 See Neil, supra note 9, at 31.
177

See id. at 27-31 (noting that those with higher risk assessments do not receive

recognizance bonds); see also Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note

124, at 973-77 (arguing against the use of money bail and for personalized
considerations in setting bail).

478 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 9 (noting the success of the Manhattan Bail

Projects success in securing pretrial defendants' appearance in court).
179 See Neil, supra note 9, at 31, 43 (noting many people can be released on their
own recognizance and that the use of risk assessments can help judges make
informed bail decisions).
480 See Carbone, supranote 56, at 553.
481 See Neil, supra note 9, at 31.
482 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1363

(noting the lack of effectiveness recogni-

zance bonds have on securing defendants' presence at trial).
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those released on their own recognizance may pose a threat to the
community, which justifies judges imposing money or cash-only
bail to ensure both their compliance with the law and future appearance in court.483 However, while felony defendants released on their
own recognizance have a tendency to flee,484 many pretrial detainees are accused of nonviolent, misdemeanor offenses.485 This
indicates that recognizance bonds may be most effective to the
group that would benefit most from their use-indigent,
nonviolent
486
pretrial defendants accused of low-level misdemeanors.
Also, natural deterrents-such as family and communal ties,
employment, or incarceration for absconding or committing new
crimes-provide defendants with the same incentive to be lawabiding and appear in court as if they were released on a cash
bond.487 While an indigent defendant's lack of financial resources
may make the defendant more of a flight risk,4 88 these natural deterrents offset an indigent defendant's increased likelihood to flee on a
recognizance bond.4 89 Implementing notification systems reminding

defendants of their court dates, times, and locations may also help
483

See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1330 (finding the safety of the community as

a factor often considered by judges when setting bail); see also Hegreness, supra
note 70, at 962 (indicating that states followed the 1984 Bail Reform Act, making
it lawful to deny bail to persons the court believe pose a danger to the community).
484 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1361 n.84 (describing one study that found
roughly half of felony defendants who failed to appear in court were released on
their own recognizance).
485 See id. at 1346; see also Neil, supra note 9, at 18 (noting the number of nonviolent offenders detained pretrial); see generally Neyfakh, supra note 349 (highlighting the injustice cash bail has on indigent defendants accused of low-level,
misdemeanor crimes).
486 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1311 (noting the vast majority of offenders
unable to obtain pretrial release are arrested for low-level, nonviolent offenses).
487 See Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 973 (noting that
natural deterrents like employment and personal relationships provide defendants
with incentive not to flee, such that preconditioning pretrial release on financial
status is unnecessary).
488 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1385 (pointing out that indigent defendants'
lack of resources the same lack of financial resources that prevents them from
obtaining pretrial release also makes these defendants more likely to flee).
489 See Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supranote 124, at 973.
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reduce the number of court absences, as many missed court appearances result from extraneous factors in defendants' lives, not from
defendants fleeing before trial. 490 Further, judges should not be distracted by political motives or communal pressures to be "tough on
crime. ' ,49 1 Because these outside pressures have caused many of the
problems that are prevalent in today's criminal justice system,492
judges should focus on the individual defendant when setting bail,
not conform to public or political pressures by setting high bail
amounts for those who cannot reach them.493
Ultimately, alternatives to cash-only bail and the money bail
system must be considered to eliminate the costs and consequences
of detaining indigent defendants pretrial.494 The practice of setting
high cash bails that defendants cannot afford should be abandoned
and courts should use the excessive bail clause and the sufficient
sureties' clause as a means of allowing defendants the opportunity to
post an attainable bail.495 Also, future courts confronted with the
constitutionality of cash-only bail should recognize its effect on the
indigent instead of focusing exclusively on dangerousness or malleable interpretative tools. 496 Trial courts deciding whether to impose
cash-only bail should (1) adhere to all of the factors in setting bail;
490

See Neil, supra note 9, at 33-35 (advocating for the use of notification systems

to offset the number of defendants failing to appear in court due to illness, work,
confusion, or forgetfulness).
491 See Wice, supra note 48, at 15, 25 (indicating that newspapers and public
opinion may exert outside pressures on judges, causing them to be more cautious
in granting pretrial release).
492 See supra Section I.C.3 (describing the public concern over increased crime
rates in the 1970s and 80s that lead to President Nixon's "war on crime' and the
1984 Bail Reform Act).
193 See Lester, supra note 31, at 44, 54 (pointing out that fear of political
backlash
may cause judges to lean towards incarceration instead of release, but arguing for
courts to "protect themselves from emotional knee-jerk reactions," "eliminat[e]
extraneous considerations," and "give all defendants the due process they are
required by the Constitution").
'9' See Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 973 ("The
assumption that pretrial release must, in all cases, be conditioned on the posting of
financial security should be discarded.").
195 See supra Section I.A.
496 See supra Section III.B.
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(2) carefully consider a defendant's danger to the community; and,
(3) when appropriate, use nonfinancial conditions and alternatives
for the defendant's pretrial release.49 7
CONCLUSION
The overwhelming number of indigent criminal defendants
that are detained before trial-only because these defendants are too
poor to post bail-has demonstrated the need for reform. 4 98 The
current bail system is predicated on courts' needs to ensure defendants' future appearance in court, while the system focuses almost
exclusively on defendants' potential danger to the community rather
than defendants' liberty interests. 4 99 The most recent judicial tool
judges use to secure defendants' appearance in court is cash-only
bail. 50 0 States are split as to whether cash-only bail violates the
accused's constitutional right to be bailable by sufficient sureties.50 1
Ultimately, there are effective, efficient, and more cost-friendly
solutions to the current bail system that are readily available for
courts and legislatures to implement.50 2 These alternatives operate to
secure defendants' pretrial release and protect defendants' interest in
freedom before conviction.50 3 For "[i]n our society liberty is the
norm,' 5°4 and ifcourts can deny a person their freedom by imposing

197

See supra Sections III.B-C.

498 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1403 ("At any given time, thousands of

criminal defendants around the country are imprisoned to ensure their presence at
trial despite being eligible for release, simply because they lack the financial
resources to make bail.").
'99
See supra Part I.
500 See supra Part II.
501 See supra Section II.C.
502 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1403 ("In the absence of judicial action, thousands of criminal defendants will continue to be detained-and suffer all of the
deleterious effects of detention-long after available technology would allow the
government to achieve its goals at lower financial and human cost."); see also
supra Section III.C.
503 See supra Sections II.D.2; Section III.C.
504 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
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cash-only bail, then "the presumption of innocence, secured only
after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning. 50 5

505

Stackv. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).

